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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a family court in Australia considered whether Alex, a
thirteen year-old anatomical female diagnosed with "Gender Identity
Disorder, transsexual type," should undergo a staged course of treat-
ment that would support the child's desire to be treated as a male and
to eventually undergo sex reassignment to male.' In addition to psy-
t Hazel Beh, Ph.D., J.D., University of Hawaii, William S. Richardson
School of Law.
Milton Diamond, Ph.D., University of Hawaii, John A. Bums School of
Medicine.
1 Re Alex (2004) 180 Fain. L. R.. 89, 92, available at
http://www.familycourt.gov.au/judge/2004/htmlI/realex.html. The terms "transsexual-
ity" and "Gender Identity Dysphoria" or "Gender Identity Disorder" (GID) are often
used interchangeably. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM III) 261 (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM III]
(using the term transexualism in the classification of Gender Identity Disorders); AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(DSM IV) 532-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV] (using the terms Gender Iden-
tity Dysphoria or Gender Identity Disorder (GID)).
In any discussion of transsexuality there is a sensitive issue of how nouns
and pronouns are used. Most people with a transsexual condition identify themselves
as unequivocally members of the sex in which they aspire to live. Thus, Alex sees
himself and identifies as a male. And to Alex sex and gender are equivalent so that
male means boy or man. To most medical personnel and scientists, however, sex and
gender are separate so that it is understood that a female can live and identify as a boy
or man and a male can live and identify as a girl or woman. Milton Diamond, Sex
and Gender Are Different: Sexual Identity and Gender Identity Are Different, in
CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 320 (7th ed. 2002). Part of the issue re-
volves around how an individual's sex is considered. Over the years this has evolved
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chosocial support and counseling, physicians and psychiatrists treating
Alex proposed to begin, as the first stage of medical treatment, the
continuous administration of estrogen and progesterone to suppress
Alex's menses. The treating professionals asserted that this initial
treatment was reversible, but that it would delay the development of
undesired female sex characteristics. 2 At sixteen, if Alex desired con-
tinued treatment, the plan before the court called for the administra-
tion of a subcutaneous testosterone implant, which would "induce
irreversible masculinisation such as voice change, muscle growth,
facial and body hair, growth of the clitoris and behavioral effects 'that
would make [Alex] more assertive/aggressive and have a stronger
sexual urge.' 3 Treating physicians would also administer a hypotha-
lamic blocker which would reduce Alex's "estrogen secretion to pre-
pubertal levels" and thus delay a female puberty.
In reaching its decision, the court carefully considered the testi-
mony of the child, interested relatives, experts, treating physicians,
school officials, the caseworker, and guardian, all of whom were in
relative agreement that the treatment should proceed given the emo-
tional discomfort and social adjustment problems the child currently
experienced.4 Despite the concurrence of interested parties, the
court's decision to allow treatment, including hormonal treatment at
age thirteen that will retard puberty and irreversible treatment at age
sixteen to masculinize the child, and to facilitate the child's psychoso-
cial desire to present himself at school as a male including by allow-
so that different categories can be evaluated in arriving at this determination. See
generally ALICE DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX
(1998). Most commonly a person's sex is evaluated based on chromosomes, gonads,
hormonal titers, internal genitalia, external genital appearance, and social lifestyle.
With increasing sophistication and knowledge, however, more factors are being iden-
tified so that a final resolution on a person's "sex" can also involve different gene
constellations as well as brain sex. Over time an individual's primary sex characteris-
tic came to be regarded as the person's gonads. We now understand that an individ-
ual's gonads may not correspond even with other features of gross anatomy or genita-
lia. There is thus no universally agreed upon standard for how to assess "sex."
These discrepancies have implications over and above any grammatical
matter. A resolution of these conflicting assay methods has legal and practical ef-
fects. Understanding such difference can account for a person being considered a
male in one state, a female in another, and an intersexed person in a third. Persons
with an intersexed or transsexual condition consider, not their gonads, but their brains
and core sense of self, as the primary consideration in the determination of sex. Cur-
rently this is best evaluated by the individual's own admission rather than by any
currently available scientifically objective measure. See Rachel Wallbank, Re Kevin
in Perspective, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 461, 468-73 (2004).
2 Re Alex, 180 Fam. L. R. at 110.
3 Id. at 111.
' Id. at 125-27, 207, 211-14.
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ing a name change,5 was not without substantial controversy in Aus-
tralia.
Critics of Alex's treatment were unlikely bedfellows. Some crit-
ics of treatment argued that such life-altering elective treatment on
children should be avoided until the child has full decisional capac-
ity.7 Still others questioned the moral and medical legitimacy of sex-
change treatment for gender dysphoria generally. 8 And some in the
lesbian and gay community argued that sex reassignment is necessary
only because society is intolerant to gender-blending. 9 Those in the
feminist and other communities voiced one of the major arguments
against the judgment. They argued that the decision was the result of
patriarchal thinking.10
5 Id. at 125-32.
6 See, e.g., Sex and Drugs and Media Roll - The Family Court's Decision in
Re Alex, 37 AUSTRL. CHILD. RTS. NEWS, May 2004, at 21, 21-27 (discussing reactions
to the opinion) [hereinafter Sex and Drugs]; The 7:30 Report. Row Erupts Over
Teenage Sex Change Court Ruling (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, television
broadcast, Apr. 14, 2004), available at http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/
s1087440.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005); PM: Controversy over Teenage Sex
Change Court Ruling (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, radio broadcast, Apr. 14
2004), available at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1087372.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2005). Even Prime Minister John Howard expressed his opinion that
perhaps the court did not have the jurisdiction to make such a decision. See State
May Stop Teen Sex Change, NEWS24.coM, Apr. 15, 2004, at
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,6119,2-10-1462_1512599,00.html
(last visited May 26, 2005).
7 Sex and Drugs, supra note 6, at 23.
8 Id. at 24.
9 See id. at 22 (explaining how the deciding Judge discounted theoretical
concerns that "Alex is constructing his self image as 'really' male when in fact he is
'really' a female lesbian."); See also David Skidmore, Gender Reassignment Surgery
Does Not Help in Our Gender-Divided Society, ON LINE OPINION (Apr. 23, 2004), at
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2160 ("I find it difficult to un-
critically endorse gender reassignment surgery because of the implications it has for
those of us struggling to be accepted for who we are - openly gay and proud to be
so."); But see Karen Gurney, It's Important to Recognize That Sex and Gender Must
be Treated Differently, ON LINE OPINION (May 4, 2004), at
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2184 (rebutting Skidmore's rea-
soning).
10 Sheila Jeffreys, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University
of Melbourne, commented:
[those involved in this decision] should be seen as products of their time
and the ideological biases of male dominance. Indeed, their "truth" should
be regarded as political opinion. They rely on the notion that there can be a
"female" mind in a male's body and vice versa. Their solution is to use
chemicals, amputations, castrations and sterilisations to make the bodies of
[gender identity dysphoria] patients fit with their interpretation of what's
happening in the patient's mind.
Sheila Jeffreys, Allowing Alex's Sex Change Shows Up a Gender-biased Family
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In brief, gender identity disorder, also called gender identity dys-
phoria (GID), is defined in the medical and psychological community
as the strong and persistent disturbing belief for at least two years, that
one is actually a member of the opposite sex." The ethical di-
lemma of whether and how to treat children and adolescents with GID
is particularly difficult to sort through in the abstract. In Alex's case,
to do no intervention, i.e., to allow the child's reproductive and asso-
ciated physiological characteristics to emerge at puberty, had conse-
quences. Future treatment to reassign sex would have to be more ex-
tensive if the undesired female characteristics had been allowed to
emerge. And some authorities suggest that earlier intervention yields
a more satisfactory anatomical and psychological outcome.1 2 Most
crucially, Alex had demonstrated self-harm and threatened suicide
should his request be denied. 13 Thus, doing nothing not only was
dangerous but amounted to doing something.
It is undoubtedly tough to be a transgendered minor. 4 As the
court was well aware, Alex's depression, suicide risk, and serious
social problems at school were so troubling as to require some form of
intervention. These psychosocial symptoms can also have lifetime
consequences. The emergence of unwanted sex characteristics was
Court, ON-LINE OPINION (Apr. 23, 2004), at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/
view.asp?article=2162 (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); Shelia Jeffreys, Sex Change Urged
by Gender Bias, FEMSPEAK (Apr. 19, 2004), at http://www.femspeak.net/featuresl/
transrpt.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
I The DSM describes separate categories for adults and children and adoles-
cents. The assigned diagnostic code depends on the individual's current age: if the
disorder occurs in childhood, the code 302.6 is used; for an adolescent or adult,
302.85 is used. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) 261 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
See infra note 97 for a complete definition of Gender Identity Disorder.
12 See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
13 The risk of suicide by Alex had been mentioned by the experts consulted
and considered a real possibility by those who knew him. See infra notes 64-67 and
accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Murdered Transgendered Teen's Name to be Changed,
COURTrV.COM, at http://www.courttv.com/news/2004/0702/transgenderap.html (last
updated July 2, 2004) (reporting the murder of a transgendered youth and her
mother's decision to have the teen's name changed posthumously). It has been re-
ported that in each of the years 2000 and 2001 there were nineteen trans individuals
killed in the United States and the year 2002 was marked with two dozen anti-
transgender murders. See MONICA F. HELMS, NAT'L TRANSGENDER ADVOCACY
COALITION, Transgender Death Statistics, at http://www.ntac.org/resources/stats.asp
(last modified July 13, 2003) (providing death statistics for transgendered individu-
als). Gwendolyn Ann Smith, Remembering Our Dead, at http://www.gender.org/
remember/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (providing a memorial for deceased transgen-
dered individuals).
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producing in Alex its own psychic pain as well. Moreover, Alex's
attempts to present himself publicly as a male when his physical ap-
pearance was female would likely lead to social stigmatization, rejec-
tion, and harassment during his teen years.
While Alex needed something to be done, the other concern is
that treatment to facilitate sex change in an adolescent may be prema-
ture. Studies suggest that gender identity is fluid in childhood and
even, although less so, into adolescence. 15 GID in childhood very
often does not persist into adulthood, and adolescent manifestations of
GID sometimes do not continue into adulthood. 16 In many instances,
the adult outcome of childhood and adolescent GID manifests as ho-
mosexuality without the gender dysphoria. Thus, for the adolescent,
even allowing reversible treatment and allowing the adolescent to
present in the opposite sex has future consequences if it solidifies a
gender presentation that might have otherwise been later abandoned.
The issues surrounding treatment of children prior to puberty is
even more difficult than that posed by treatment in adolescence. In
children the issue is not whether to facilitate change, since hormonal
treatment is not recommended prior to the onset of puberty, but in-
stead whether GID can or should be suppressed. Currently there is
insufficient data to know whether psychiatric treatment can reduce
gender dysphoria and change the adult outcome. Moreover, as for
psychiatric treatment to alleviate GID, one has to question whether the
motivation is to prevent GID or the more common resulting homo-
sexuality given that either outcome may occur. Although once con-
sidered so, homosexuality is no longer considered a psychiatric condi-
tion, and therefore treatment to prevent it would be inappropriate.
17
On the other hand, GID remains a disputable psychiatric disorder.'
8
15 See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 99-101, 110-14 and accompanying text.
17 In 1973 homosexuality per se was removed from the DSM-II classification
of mental disorders and replaced in DSM-III by the category Ego-dystonic Homo-
sexuality. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM II) 39 (2nd ed. 1968) [hereinafter DSM II]; DSM III,
supra note 1, at 281. This represented a compromise between the view that preferen-
tial homosexuality is invariably a mental disorder and the view that it is merely a
normal sexual variant. While the 1973 DSM-II controversy was highly public, there
remained a related but less public controversy over the DSM-III category of Ego-
dystonic Homosexuality. This latter category was removed from the DSM-IV
(1994). See DSM IV, supra note 1, at 21-22 (Ego-dystonic homosexuality is not
categorized on the Gender Identity List).
18 There are currently, in the United States, Australia and elsewhere, differ-
ing opinions as to the suitability of considering Gender Identity Dysphoria a psychiat-
ric disorder any more than homosexuality. See Rachel Wallbank, Re Alex "Through
a Looking Glass, " AuSTL. CHILD. RTS. NEWS, May 2004, at 28. See also Nancy H.
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Thus, if parents desire such treatment, ethical issues arise concerning
the objective of treatment and whether parents have authority to con-
sent to such treatment.
Put simply, there is no single answer as to how to treat children
and adolescents with GID. Instead, professionals must exercise clini-
cal judgment in developing and proposing a care plan. Even when
sound clinical judgment is exercised, there are substantial risks in
treating and in not treating these minors. In light of this, how best can
the legal system assist children and adolescents to achieve a satisfac-
tory short and long term outcome? What role can the law play in
lessening the social and psychological problems of these youth?
The Australian decision offers a window into the life of a minor
with GID. It provides courts with a roadmap as to how to participate
in a thoughtful, cautious, individualized and collaborative treatment
plan. However, while Re Alex is instructive, the authors note that,
unless there is disagreement among parents, physicians, and the child,
in the United States, generally parties need not seek judicial approval
to provide care to minors.19 Courts in the United States exercise a
more circumspect role in medical decision making generally.20
This Article examines the Australian decision, discusses prevail-
ing views on treating GID in children and adolescents, and describes
the real-life difficulties these young people suffer. This Article further
comments, that in light of recent negative decisions in the United
States concerning the legal rights of transgendered individuals, less
judicial involvement in deciding whether and how to treat minors with
GID is probably best. These medical decisions should occur outside
the judicial system when all the parties concur, especially when the
treatment falls within established standards of care. When the parties
Bartlett et al., Is Gender Identity Disorder in Children a Mental Disorder?, 43 SEX
ROLES 753, 776 (2000) (summarizing data and studies and concluding "comparisons
presented in this paper fail to support a conclusion that GID in children, as it appears
in DSM-1V, meets the criteria of mental disorder"); Kenneth J. Zucker, A Factual
Correction to Bartlett, Vasey, and Bukowski's (2000) "Is Gender Identity Disorder in
Children a Mental Disorder? ", 46 SEX ROLES 263 (2002) (stating that Bartlett et al.
misread the data from the author's report and providing a correction of data reported
by Bartlett et al.). This "correction" was responded to by the authors and seems to
strengthen the original article. Nancy H. Bartlett et al., Cross Sex Wishes and Gender
Identity Disorder: A Reply to Zucker, 49 SEX ROLES 191 (2003). Zucker and Bartlett
and her co-authors are Canadians.
19 With this decision, minors are required to resort to the Family Court in
Australia for resolving future transsexual issues in Australia. Prior to the decision,
one might assume that if all parties were in agreement, and the minor was not a ward
of the state, treatment decisions were made without legal involvement.
20 See infra note 158.
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do not concur, other strategies need be considered, and it is here that
Re Alex gives us guidance.
The Article concludes by acknowledging that treatment decisions
are difficult, but must be made. The authors encourage that, whether
these decisions are made in court or by parents, in consultation with
clinicians, all medical decisions must be individualized. Decisions
should be based on the child's needs, rather than by narrow views
regarding gender variation. While the child's future decision-making
capacity and autonomy should be preserved if the child is not suffi-
ciently mature to make decisions, these goals should not be an im-
pediment to treating the child who needs treatment now. In every
case, the decision as to whether and how to treat, has future conse-
quences. Lastly, the authors present for consideration several other
matters that need attention relative to a minor's sexual transition.
II. THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH:
INDIVIDUALIZED, JUDICIALLY APPROVED
INTERVENTION
A. A Unique Judicial Role
A case of this type is more certain to come before a court in Aus-
tralia than in the United States. Under Australia's Family Law Act of
1975, the Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction over matters con-
cerning the welfare of children. 21 Family law is largely decided at the
federal level, thus the standards announced by the court are, except for
the state of Western Australia, precedential throughout the country.
In a landmark 1992 Australian case, concerning the sterilization of a
mentally disabled minor, the court held that parents lack authority to
consent on behalf of their children to certain medical decisions and
that prior judicial authorization is necessary.22 The court did not base
21 Family Law Act, 1975, s. 41 (Austl.). The state of Western Australia
maintains its own Family Court. See Family Court of Australia, The Courts Involved,
at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/presence/connect/www/home/guide/before/basics/
stepbefore_basics_courts (last updated Mar. 29, 2004). See generally Alastair
Nicholson, Setting the Scene: Australian Family Law and the Family Court - A Per-
spective From the Bench, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 279 (2002) (providing information on the
Family Law Act of Australia and the jurisdiction of the Family Court); Alastair
Nicholson & Margaret Harrison, Specialist But Not Unified: The Family Court of
Australia, 37 FAM. L.Q. 441 (2003).
22 Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Cmty. Servs. v. J.W.B. & S.M.B. [Marion's
Case] (1992) 175 CLR 218 (holding that (1) when an application is made to the Fam-
ily Court, it has jurisdiction to authorize a sterilization in appropriate circumstances;
and (2) the Family Court cannot increase the authority of the guardian so that he or
she can consent to the sterilization of the child).
2005)
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its ruling on the right to procreate, as decisions in the United States
have done.3 It more broadly held: "Court authorisation [to medical
treatment] is required, first, because of the significant risk of making
the wrong decision, either as to a child's present or future capacity to
consent or about what are the best interests of a child who cannot con-
sent, and secondly, because the consequences of a wrong decision are
particularly grave. 24
Since then, examples of medical care requiring prior judicial ap-
proval in Australia have included harvesting bone marrow for the
benefit of another family member, 25 the refusal of life-saving medical
care,26 and sex reassignment in an intersex child.27 Thus, the State
(because Alex was a ward of the State) was compelled to seek prior
judicial approval, even if all the interested parties, including Alex (a
minor lacking capacity to consent), were in agreement.28
The court concluded that the proposed treatment in this instance
required prior judicial approval under its case law:
[T]he treatment plan in the present case falls within the cate-
gory of cases that require court authorization. There are sig-
nificant risks attendant to embarking on a process that will al-
ter a child or young person who presents as physically of one
sex in the direction of the opposite sex, even where the Court
is not asked to authorise surgery. Also, it cannot be said on
the evidence that the treatment is to cure a disease or correct
some malfunction. 9
The court's approach in deciding what treatment Alex should re-
ceive was broadly inclusive. The court sought participation and tes-
timony from individuals with an interest in Alex's care and of those
with particular expertise to aid the court. The court appointed a Child
Representative to represent Alex's interests, in addition to Alex's le-
23 Id. at 246-50 (providing a discussion of cases from the United States that
based their rulings on the fundamental right to procreate and explaining the court's
own reasons for refusing to give parents the right to authorize sterilization procedures
for their children).
24 Id. at 250. See also In re A (1993) 16 Fam. L. R. 715 (summarizing
Marion's case and giving permission for gender reassignment surgery on a fourteen
year old genetic female with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia who identified as a
male, unable, due to minority status to give informed consent).
25 In the Marriage of GWW & CMW (1997) 21 Fam. L. R. 612.
26 Re Michael [No. 2) (1994) 19 Fam. L. R. 27.
27 In re A (1993) 16 Fam. L.R. 715.
28 See infra note 158.
29 Re Alex (2004) 180 Farn. L. R.. 89, 124, available at hp:/www.familycourtgov.au/
judge/2004/html/realex.html.
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gal guardian whose input was more parental.30 It invited participation
from family members, including the aunt with whom Alex resided,
and from his estranged mother. 31 The court also allowed the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission to intervene and make
"submissions on the human rights principles applicable to the case. ' '32
In addition to testimony from various treating professionals, 33 the
court obtained testimony from experts who reviewed Alex's records
and commented upon the proposed treatment.34 The court asked its
own questions about the treatment, and required follow-up responses
from the witnesses.35
The judge met privately with Alex, at the minor's request, and
noted that the court was holding certain discussions with Alex confi-
dential.36 It heard testimony from Alex's aunt, and principals from
Alex's primary school and his new secondary school.37 It obtained a
family report from a psychologist who had treated Alex.
38
Early in the proceedings, the court delivered interim orders allow-
ing Alex to enroll in high school with a male first name.39 The court
also issued an interim order authorizing "reversible hormonal treat-
ment," in light of the testimony of a treating psychiatrist that "the ur-
gency of treatment is such that it should begin as soon as possible."
40
As the court acknowledged,
evidence.., was adduced though [sic] a hearing process that
differed in a number of respects from the traditional form ....
[T]he procedural modifications to the hearing process en-
hanced the depth and richness of the evidence, and thereby
30 Id. at 93, 96-97.
I' d. 110.
32 Id. at 93. Established in 1986, one of its responsibilities is to provide
independent advice to the courts. THE HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, INFO SHEET, at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/info_sheet.html (last visited
Feb. 23, 2005).
33 The treating professionals included Professor P, an associate professor of
psychiatry; Professor W, an associate professor of pediatrics and a pediatric endocri-
nologist; Dr. N, a child and adolescent psychiatrist specializing in gender issues. By
court order the identity of the experts was sealed.
14 Re Alex, 180 Fain. L. R. at 97.
35 id.
36 Id. at 98.
31 Id. at 93, 97.
3 Id. at 97.
31 Id. at 99.
40 id.
20051
better served the aim of an outcome which will be in Alex's
best interests.41
Specifically, the court explained that much of the evidence was
taken "in affidavit form," the hearing itself was "inquisitorial rather
than adversarial"; it was conducted in a private conference room
rather than in a court room; it followed a "discussion format" that
allowed for "a dialogue in respect of each other's evidence"; and it
took place over a period of time so that witnesses could consider and
respond to the testimony of others.42 The court characterized the hear-
ing as "an orderly discussion between witnesses and legal representa-
tives ... and myself."
43
B. The Factual Circumstances
The case involved a 13 year-old anatomical female diagnosed
with gender identity disorder who self-identified as a male. 44 Alex's
troubled family and social history are worth noting. Alex's father,
with whom he enjoyed a loving relationship, one which he character-
ized as "like best friends," died when Alex was five or six years old.45
His death was "clearly devastating," according to the court.46 Alex's
psychiatrist noted, "Alex reported being able to feel at times his father
was alive and able to communicate with him, [although] '[t]here is no
evidence of delusions' and '[t]his phenomenon seemed consistent
with his own process of bereavement and socially not unacceptable
way of managing the loss of [his] father.' 47
Alex regarded his mother as "affectionless and harsh. '*48  After
his father's death, Alex's mother remarried and Alex's stepfather
sponsored their entry to Australia.49 Alex arrived in Australia speak-
ing little English. 50 Relationships in the new family were unsatisfac-
tory. At ten years of age Alex's mother told child protection workers
"that she did not want Alex in her life and did not want to see him
again.",51 Alex was eventually removed from the home and placed in
41 Id. at 97-98.
42 Id. at 98.
43 id.
44 The court referred to the minor as Alex a male pseudonym, in the gender
identity of the child's choice. Id. at 92.
41 Id. at 100.
46 id.
47 id.
41 Id. at 99.
49 ld. at 100.
50 id.
51 Id. at 101. The mother reported that Alex threatened to kill his step-
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substitute residential care.52 Although contacted by the court, Alex's
mother did not participate in the instant proceedings. In 2001 Alex's
mother and step-father had written the court "renouncing their rela-
tionship with Alex."53
Although at the time of the hearing Alex resided with a maternal
aunt, he remained a ward of the State. 5 Alex's placement with the
aunt had been interrupted at one point, when, due to aggressive and
suicidal behavior, Alex was temporarily placed in foster care. This
"breakdown" called attention to Alex's need for an assessment of his
gender crises. 5  A caseworker brought the case for treatment on
Alex's behalf.56 As his caseworker described his earlier placement,
[w]e had to put him in a placement. . . because he was actu-
ally threatening to kill himself and saying he would rather be
dead and didn't want to live this way, that he wasn't a girl and
didn't want to be a girl. I felt very seriously that he actually
meant it.
57
Alex's male gender identity was reportedly persistent and long-
standing.58 For example, Alex reported to a psychiatrist that "[he]
grew up in [his] first years of life believing that [he] was a boy" 59 and
that "[he] has always thought of [himself] as a boy. 6°
Alex also attempted to present himself as a male to others even
though it caused social problems. He told others he was a boy and he
used the boys' restroom, even after being advised to use the girls'
restroom. When he was told to use the girls' restroom he "started
wearing nappies to school and reported ... that [he] would not drink
any liquids all day so that [he] did not need to use the toilet during
school time.'
Alex's tenacity eventually won out. Alex was so persistent that
his primary school finally accommodated him by allowing him to "use
the enclosed toilet for people with disabilities., 62 The principal of his
siblings and that there was "no love between her and Alex and his step-father had said
that he has no relationship with Alex and did not see Alex as important." Id. at 101.
52 id.
5 Id. at 102.
54 Id. at 101.
55 Id. at 102-03.
56 Id. at 96.
17 Id. at 102.
58 See, e.g., id. at 103-04.
" Id. at 105.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 104-05.
62 Id. at 103.
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grade school stated that the staff and teachers eventually "accepted
that [Alex] was different," explaining, "[s]o it was a matter of coun-
seling the staff to say, 'Well, we need to accept this,' and staff did., 63
Alex was eventually diagnosed with depression and gender iden-
tity disorder at the age of twelve. The court considered Alex's mental
health history in depth - clearly suicide was on the minds of the court
and witnesses. Even in primary school, Alex's severe depression and
suicidal ideation was alarming. The principal explained that he "was
in my office and [he] was definitely quite distraught and wanting to
kill [himself] because nobody was taking this whole thing seriously
about gender." 64 The treating psychiatrist said, "[t]here was no evi-
dence of delusional disorder or thought disorder' and [his] orientation
and cognition were intact., 65 Nevertheless, Alex "acknowledged hav-
ing perceptual disturbances, that he would hear his own voice or the
voice of his father, and ... said [that] 'somebody can read my mind
and the thoughts in my mind.'
66
In the application to approve treatment, Alex's treating psychia-
trist wrote the following: "[T]he urgency of treatment is such that it
should begin as soon as possible. [Alex] says that if treatment is de-
layed and she [sic] has to go to high school with the presence of peri-
ods and increasingly feminised body, [he] will be extremely distressed
and disadvantaged by that."67
Alex's psychiatrists also explored his sexual orientation, asking
whether his "wish for treatment emanates from his attraction to
girls."68 Alex's caseworker, Ms. R., perhaps the one adult most like a
parent figure, was not entirely convinced that sexual orientation might
indeed be at issue. She testified:
[E]arly on I actually raised the idea with him that he may sim-
ply have a same sex attraction and that this is where his gen-
der issues arise from. He quite vehemently denied that it was
anything to do with that. I'm still not totally convinced in
every single way possible that that isn't part of the issue for
him. We could actually be looking at two separate issues
rather than just one that's all indicative of the same thing. So
63 Id.
64 Id. at 103.
65 Id. at 102.
66 id.
67 Id. at 99.
68 Id. at 108 (explaining that sexual orientation (how one views a sexual
partner) is distinct from sexual and gender identity (how one views self)). See Dia-
mond, supra note 1, at 320.
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I've always advocated that we take the timely sort of ap-
proach and not rush into anything and have made sure that he
understands that there's a whole range of people in the com-
munity and just because he sees a man and a woman and a
couple of children and that seems to be the bulk of what he
would be exposed to in his own life, that that does not mean
that that's all there is in the world.
I take him to places ... where he sees a far greater diversity
of people and genders and images and try and get him to see
that may be a far more effeminate looking male might walk
past and a very much more masculinised looking woman
might be nearby and that this is a whole range of things and
it's quite acceptable to be anywhere within that range and that
as he gets older he has more power within himself and more
options about what he chooses for himself and that what he's
dealing with right now doesn't have to continue to be his real-
ity.
69
The court considered the possibility that Alex's gender identity
might not yet be fixed. The court acknowledged that, "with adoles-
cent development Alex may reconsider his gender identity as a male
and that if such a change in self-image transpires, he may come to
view himself as a lesbian. It is not, however, the current assessment of
his state of mind and sense of self." 70 Although the court acknowl-
edged that Alex's gender identity and sexual orientation might change
in time, it concluded:
In light of the adamant nature of Alex's gender identification
and the on-going concern as to how traumatised he would be
if the proposed treatment were not to otherwise go ahead, I
would not delay treatment merely because of the theoretical
risk that Alex is constructing his self image as "really" male
when in fact he is "really" a female lesbian and will come to
see himself that way over time.
It is true that if Alex does shift in his self-perceptions after
testosterone has begun being administered he will have cer-
tain irreversible masculine characteristics. I am satisfied,
69 Re Alex, 180 Fam. L. R. at 109.
70 Id. Typically transsexuals do not consider themselves as homosexuals
when they are involved with a member of their same sex. They view this relationship
as heterosexual since they see themselves in terms of their preferred gender. Should
Alex in the future see himself as a woman, in that case, she (and society) would con-
sider a relationship with a female as a lesbian one.
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however, that in the course of the proposed treatment, which
includes ongoing psychological and psychiatric assistance,
there will be attention to whether there emerges a change in
his self-perceptions which impacts upon the treatment plan I
am asked to authorise.7'
Thus, the court had before it, a thirteen year-old female (as meas-
ured by gross anatomy and reproductive physiology) with a persistent
and longstanding male gender identity, who presented a serious sui-
cide risk, who had a depression rooted, at least in part, in gender iden-
tity issues. Alex himself had a strong desire for treatment, his legal
guardian and his aunt supported treatment, and all the professionals
consulted concurred that treatment was appropriate.
The timing of the application in Alex's case was fortuitous. At
the time of the application, the diagnosis had been established for
nearly two years by several treating psychiatrists. Alex had also be-
gun to menstruate, and clinical guidelines in treating GID "recom-
mend that young people have had some experience of themselves in
the post-pubertal state of their biological sex before starting any
physical intervention." 72 The two years in which Alex had been living
as a boy also satisfied one of the criteria in establishing suitability for
surgical transition established by the Harry Benjamin International
Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA). This is the professional
organization primarily concerned with the understanding and treat-
ment of GID. 73 In addition, this particular time presented a conven-
ient opportunity to make an easier transition, because Alex was about
to switch from primary to secondary school.
74
C. Informed Consent
The court considered Alex's capacity to consent to the treatment.
It assessed Alex's maturity, understanding of his condition, and intel-
lectual capacity. Alex was described as "mature" and "intelligent." 75
71 Id.
72 Id. at 111 (quoting the Royal College of Psychiatrists' Guidance 1998
Gender Identity Disorders in Children and Adolescents - Guidance for Management).
This recommendation is controversial. It is made with the belief that the child should
experience some of the features of puberty and sexual maturation before deciding to
abandon the birth sex. Other professionals, however, stress that allowing pubertal
changes to occur would seriously hamper and compromise anatomic and psychologi-
cal transition. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
73 See The Harry Benjamin Int'l Gender Dysphoria Ass'n, at
http://www.hbigda.org/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
74 ReAlex, 180 Fam. L. R. at 100.
71 Id. at 118.
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A treating psychiatrist stated that he "fully understands at this stage
the mechanism of the action for the proposed hormone treatment, and
side effects and the benefits." Nevertheless, the psychiatrist stated, "I
believe that it is not appropriate at age 13 [that he] should be wholly
responsible for the decision to undergo hormone treatment., 76 The
court agreed, noting that with regard to sex change treatment, "[i]t is
highly questionable whether a 13 year old could ever be regarded as
having the capacity ... and this situation may well continue until the
young person reaches maturity." 7 The court explained that while
Alex lacked legal capacity, his wishes were considered in light of his
maturity:
In my view, the evidence does not establish that Alex has the
capacity to decide for himself whether to consent to the pro-
posed treatment. It is one thing for a child or young person to
have a general understanding of what is proposed and its ef-
fect but it is quite another to conclude that he/she has suffi-
cient maturity to fully understand the grave nature and effects
of the proposed treatment.
However, in the present case, I have uncontroverted evidence
not only that the proposed procedure is entirely consistent
with Alex's wishes but also that the expert evidence as to the
best interests of Alex accords with those wishes. 8
Thus, while the court considered Alex's desires, it did not con-
clude that Alex was sufficiently mature to make such a life-altering
decision without the additional safeguard of court approval.79
D. The Treatment Plan
In authorizing a treatment plan, the court considered the justifica-
tions for and against treatment and weighed the risks associated with
76 id.
77 Id. at 120. The age of majority in Australia is 18. Id. at 112-13.
78 Id. at 119.
79 The conclusion that he lacked capacity would likely have been the same
under the "mature minor" doctrine followed in some United States' jurisdictions. In
Cardwell v Bechtell, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744-46 (Tenn. 1987), a so-called "rule of sev-
ens" was enunciated. If younger than seven years of age the child is presumed to be
decisionally incapacitated and that presumption cannot be overcome. From seven to
fourteen years of age, the presumption of incapacity can be overridden depending
upon the child's ability to understand the medical problem and consequences of op-
tional procedures and has the ability to express a choice based on stable values. A
presumption of decisional capacity is granted after the age of fourteen years.
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both treatment and nontreatment. The court accepted that Alex's
acute psychological distress justified treatment now. It also acknowl-
edged that his gender identity and sexual orientation might change
with maturity, but considered that experts in Alex's case discounted
that possibility:
The evidence speaks with one voice as to the distress that
Alex is genuinely suffering in a body which feels alien to him
and disgusts him, particularly due to menstruation. It is also
consistent as to his unwavering and profound wish to present
as the male he feels himself to be. The possibility that Alex is
an emerging lesbian has been considered but not accepted by
the two expert psychiatric witnesses who have assessed him.
80
The court considered lesser or alternative interventions, noting
that, "[t]he prognosis for behavioral intervention to change Alex's
self-image and behaviour is poor."81 The court weighed the risks, and
here paid special attention to Alex's own appreciation of the conse-
quences:
I have canvassed above the physical consequences arising
from each stage of treatment and I am satisfied that Alex has
the capacity and indeed does in fact know the side effects that
may arise and further that he wishes the proposed treatment
with knowledge of such risks. The social implications of the
proposed treatment are that Alex will face challenges in his
chosen identity in respect of peer relationships, possible bul-
lying and ostracism, but I am satisfied that impressive steps
have been taken to anticipate such risks.
On the other side of the balance, if treatment is not permitted
there is consistent concern that Alex will revert to unhappi-
ness, behavioural difficulties at home and self-harming behav-
iour. Socially, he will be significantly ill at ease with body
and self-image during his period of adolescent development
until he is competent to make his own treatment decision.
Transition into a male public identity will be more difficult
than if it occurs at the commencement of secondary school.82
'0 Re Alex, 180 Fam. L. R. at 125.
81 Id.
2 Id. at 126.
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The medical treatment the court approved would progress in two
stages. The court noted that, "Alex's mental health and endocri-
nological treatment would be monitored by a team approach" and that
the orders of the court were intended to allow "treatment opportuni-
ties" rather than "imposing a requirement of taking such treatment."
8 3
The court authorized the reversible hormone treatment commenced
under its earlier interim orders to continue. The goal of the reversible
treatment was to suppress Alex's menses.84
The court further authorized, subject to consensus and an evalua-
tion of his needs at that time, the institution of irreversible hormonal
treatment at the age of sixteen.85 That treatment would facilitate
"masculinisation such as voice change, muscle growth, facial and
body hair, growth of the clitoris and behavioural effects 'that would
make [Alex] more assertive/aggressive and have a stronger sex
urge.'
86
The court also considered the social and educational risks in mak-
ing the transition. It issued orders to facilitate a social transition as
well. The court further authorized a name change and issued an order
that Alex be allowed to enroll in school under his new name. 7 In
weighing Alex's best interests, it also carefully considered evidence
concerning how the school would assist and protect Alex's privacy
and prevent stigmatization and bullying.88
The applicant did not seek any order to amend Alex's designated
sex on his birth certificate, but the court criticized current laws that
focus on surgical reassignment as the sine qua non for changing the
birth certificate:
I consider it is a matter of regret that a number of Australian
jurisdictions require surgery as a prerequisite to the alteration
of a transsexual person's birth certificate in order for the re-
cord to align a person's sex with his/her chosen gender iden-
83 Id. at 112.
84 The treatment was continuous administration of an oral contraceptive.
When taken without monthly interruption, menses are suppressed. Experts testified
that the treatment would not affect future "ovarian function and fertility." Id. at 110.
85 Id. at 110-11, 125, 131. Treatment at sixteen could include continuation of
the female hormone-blocking agents (analogue therapy) and subcutaneous testoster-
one implants. Id. at 111. There was disagreement whether the analogue therapy
should be instituted first. According to the experts an analogue therapy period was
described as "hormonally neutral" and thus "gives these adolescents time to think
about the issues." It therefore constituted a more cautious approach. Id. at 94, 111.
Ultimately, the court left that decision to Alex and his treating physicians at that time.
86 Id. at 111.
87 Id. at 95, 113.
88 id. at 113-14.
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tity. This is of little help to someone who is unable to under-
take such surgery. The reasons may differ but for example in
the present case, a young person such as Alex, on the evi-
dence, would not be eligible for surgical intervention until at
least the age of 18 years.89
The court noted that requiring surgery as the test for birth certifi-
cate amendment could cause hardship, embarrassment, and stigmati-
zation to those who could not or would not undergo surgery. As the
court stated, "[a] requirement of surgery seems to me to be a cruel and
unnecessary restriction upon a person's right to be legally recognized
in a sex which reflects the chosen gender identity and would appear to
have little justifications on grounds of principle." 90
Remarkably, the court also considered Alex's financial future, es-
pecially his ability to eventually pay for future treatment, including
surgery. In determining that Alex should remain a ward of the state
while in the care of his aunt, the court noted that medical and educa-
tional expenses would be provided and that the state also usually of-
fered transitional financial assistance when the child reached majority.
Moreover, in the case of disabled children, the state might also pro-
vide some continued assistance after the age of eighteen. Finally,
because the aunt was being paid by the state for providing care to
Alex, and she was saving all such money for Alex in a joint account,
there would be money to pay for future treatment. 91 This led the court
to conclude that Alex should remain a ward of the state.92
III. TREATING GID IN CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS
The following sections briefly explore the complexity of diagno-
sis and treatment of GID in children and in adolescents. Treatment at
each stage of life raises unique ethical and medical dilemmas. In pre-
adolescent children, the issue is whether to offer therapy aimed di,-
rectly at reducing gender nonconformity, in hopes of preventing adult
" Id. at 130.
90 Id. at 131.
9' Id. at 113.
92 The expense of all treatment aspects is considerable and effects how many,
both within and outside the trans community, view the medical/psychiatric designa-
tion of GID. As a medical condition gender identity disorder can be covered under
certain insurance plans but maintains a stigma. As a non-psychiatric gender variation
there is less stigma but a potentially large expense to be personally home. In some
cases this is a double-edged sword since coverage for sex-reassignment surgery (SRS)
is often denied to those with a "mental condition." See infra note 190.
[Vol. 15:239
TREA TING GENDER NONCONFORMITY
GID. Three problems of such treatment are: (1) the lack of data sup-
porting the efficacy of such treatment; (2) the inappropriateness of
preventing homosexuality as an end goal of treatment; and (3) funda-
mental skepticism that gender identity dysphoria should be classified
as a disorder at all. As to this third problem, many believe that GID,
like homosexuality, should be seen as just another human sexual
variation rather than a psychosexual problem in need of treatment and
should therefore be removed as a DSM diagnosis.93 In adolescents,
the ethical problems involve whether to treat certain youth with per-
sistent GID with reversible and partially reversible hormonal treat-
ment before adulthood when psychosocial treatment alone does not
alleviate their distress. The problems here again are threefold: (1) the
lack of solid data concerning who should be treated; (2) whether such
treatment is appropriate before adulthood; and (3) whether the treat-
ment might eventually prove disadvantageous.94
A. GID and Treatment Options in Pre-Adolescents
GID in adults is considered rare; however, accurate prevalence es-
timates vary broadly. 95 GID, which encompasses a spectrum of gen-
93 See Bartlett et al., supra note 18 at 776 (recommending that the GID cate-
gory in children should not appear in future editions of the DSM); Madeline H.
Wyndzen, A Personal & Scientific Look at a Mental Illness Model of Transgender-
ism, DIVISION 44 NEWSL. (Society for the Psychological Study of Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Issues, a division of the American Psychological Association), Spring 2004,
at 3, available at http://www.apa.org/divisions/div44/2004Spring.pdf. See GID Re-
form Advocates, at http://members.cox.net/gidreform/index.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2005) (dedicated to GID and DSM reform). See also ARLENE ISTAR LEV,
TRANSGENDER EMERGENCE: THERAPEUTIC GUIDELINES FOR WORKING WITH GENDER
VARIANT PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES 168-81 (2004) (critiquing past diagnoses of
transgendered and transsexual people); Richard A. Isay, Remove Gender Identity
Disorder in DSM, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Nov. 21, 1997, at 9.
94 Unfortunately there have been no large-scale controlled studies, either for
children or adults, as to the effectiveness of any sort of treatment for GID compared
with another. And there have been no controlled studies comparing the outcome of
treatment with the outcome from no treatment. ARIF (the Aggressive Research Intel-
ligence Facility of the University of Birmingham, England - an entity financed by the
British National Health Service to evaluate medically relevant questions), in a state-
ment updated to July 2004, reported that most studies, to date, have been biased pro
or con surgery so no definitive conclusion can be made although "the research pub-
lished generally states that the effects are beneficial." AGGRESSIVE RESEARCH
INTELLIGENCE FACILITY, GENDER REASSIGNMENT SURGERY, at
http://www.bham.ac.uk/arif/genderreassign.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) (discuss-
ing the effects of gender reassignment surgery).
95 See THE HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASS'N, STANDARDS
OF CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS, SIXTH VERSION (Feb. 2001), at
http://www.hbigda.org/socv6.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) [hereinafter HBIGDA
SOC]. The association summarizes the variations and explains why precise preva-
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der discordances,96 is generally marked by "a strong and persistent
cross-gender identification and a persistent discomfort with their sex
or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. 9 7 The
lence estimates have been elusive:
When the gender identity disorders first came to professional attention,
clinical perspectives were largely focused on how to identify candidates for
sex reassignment surgery. As the field matured, professionals recognized
that some persons with bona fide gender identity disorders neither desired
nor were candidates for sex reassignment surgery. The earliest estimates of
prevalence for transsexualism in adults were 1 in 37,000 males and 1 in
107,000 females. The most recent prevalence information from the Nether-
lands for the transsexual end of the gender identity disorder spectrum is 1 in
11,900 males and 1 in 30,400 females. Four observations, not yet firmly
supported by systematic study, increase the likelihood of an even higher
prevalence: 1) unrecognized gender problems are occasionally diagnosed
when patients are seen with anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, conduct
disorder, substance abuse, dissociative identity disorders, borderline per-
sonality disorder, other sexual disorders and intersexed conditions; 2) some
nonpatient male transvestites, female impersonators, transgender people,
and male and female homosexuals may have a form of gender identity dis-
order; 3) the intensity of some persons' gender identity disorders fluctuates
below and above a clinical threshold; 4) gender variance among female-
bodied individuals tends to be relatively invisible to the culture, particularly
to mental health professionals and scientists.
See also Lynn Conway, How Frequently Does Transsexualism Occur?, (2001), at
http://ai.eecs.uniich.edu/people/conway/TS/TSprevalence.html (last updated Dec. 17,
2002). Conway's estimates are much higher than those of the HBIGDA.
96 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 11, at 578.
97 Id. at 581-82. The diagnostic criteria of GID in the DSM IV-TR makes
particular age related distinctions:
Diagnostic criteria for Gender Identity Disorder
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not
merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of be-
ing the other sex). In children, the disturbance is manifested
by four (or more) of the following:
(1) repeatedly stated desire to be, or insistence that he or
she is, the other sex
(2) in boys, preference for cross-dressing or simulating fe-
male attire; in girls, insistence on wearing only stereo-
typical masculine clothing
(3) strong and persistent preferences for cross-sex roles in
make-believe play or persistent fantasies of being the
other sex
(4) intense desire to participate in the stereotypical games
and pastimes of the other sex
(5) strong preference for playmates of the other sex. In ado-
lescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested by
symptoms such as a stated desire to be the other sex,
frequent passing as the other sex, desire to live or be
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individual recognizes his or her biological sex (sexual identity) but
considers it inconsistent with gender identity (how the individual pre-
fers to see self within society). 98
The prevalence of childhood GID is not known with any certainty,
and estimates come principally from small studies and clinical experi-
ence. 99 Researchers assume that it is more common in children than
in adults, based on the observation that the childhood diagnosis does
not usually persist until adulthood. 00 In both adults and children,
treated as the other sex, or the conviction that he or she
has the typical feelings and reactions of the other sex.
B. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappropri-
ateness in the gender role of that sex.
In children, the disturbance is manifested by any of the fol-
lowing: in boys, assertion that his penis or testes are disgusting
or will disappear or assertion that it would be better not to have
a penis, or aversion toward rough-and-tumble play and rejec-
tion of male stereotypical toys, games, and activities; in girls,
rejection of urinating in a sitting position, assertion that she has
or will grow a penis, or assertion that she does not want to
grow breasts or menstruate, or marked aversion toward norma-
tive feminine clothing.
In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested
by symptoms such as preoccupation with getting rid of pri-
mary and secondary sex characteristics (e.g., request for hor-
mones, surgery, or other procedures to physically alter sex-
ual characteristics to simulate the other sex) or belief that he
or she was born the wrong sex.
C. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condi-
tion.
D. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impair-
ment in social, occupational, or other important areas of function-
ing.
Code based on current age:
302.6 Gender Identity Disorder in Children
302.85 Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents or Adults
Specify if (for sexually mature individuals):
Sexually Attracted to Males
Sexually Attracted to Females
Sexually Attracted to Both
Sexually Attracted to Neither
98 When such an inconsistency exists the mantra becomes "change my body,
not my mind." See Diamond, supra note 1, at 325.
99 PEGGY T. COHEN-KETTENIS & FRIEDEMANN PFAfFLIN, TRANSGENDERISM
AND INTERSEXUALITY IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 64-66, 83 (2003). See also
Kenneth J. Zucker, Gender Identity Disorder, in CHILD AND ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 737, 738-39 (Michael Rutter & Eric Taylor eds., 4th ed. 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Gender Identity Disorder] (noting the deficiencies in various approaches to esti-
mating the prevalence in children).
100 Zucker, Gender Identity Disorder, supra note 99, at 739. Adult transsexu-
als, invariably say their GID started early in childhood.
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GID occurs more frequently in males than females; the effect of social
and cultural factors to explain the differences is not clear. 10 1 There is
some support for the view that boys are identified more often because
"parents, teachers, and peers are less tolerant of cross-gender behavior
in boys... [and] girls may need to display more cross-gender behavior
than boys before a referral is initiated."'' 0 2 Lev has written:
Boys are punished (i.e., treated) for gender-deviant behavior,
whereas girl's behavior is tolerated and often rewarded, as
long as their behavior stays within certain, less confining,
guidelines. The language of the DSM reflects this, since boys
need only to "prefer" girl's clothing, but girls must "insist" on
boy's clothing to meet diagnostic criteria. The DSM's im-
plicit approval of sex-role divisions does not merely reflect
social values but reinforces them.'03
The etiology of GID is uncertain. Psychological theories focus on
parent characteristics, on the child's psychological make-up, and on
life events or on a combination of factors as predisposing influences.
104 Biological theories postulate that prenatal hormonal levels, brain
development, structure, and chemistry contribute to GID.
1°5
The diagnosis of childhood GID can be difficult because gender is
fluid and "cross gender profiles may change over time" for a variety
of reasons.10 6 Diagnosis of GID also requires clinical assessment of
101 See Kenneth J. Zucker, Gender Identity Development and Issues, 13 CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 551, 554 (2004) [hereinafter Gender
Identity], (Milton Diamond & Alayne Yates eds. 2004) [hereinafter Sex and Gender];
COHEN-KETrENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 66.
102 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 554.
103 LEV, supra note 93, at 176.
104 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 554. See also id. at 558-62
(summarizing biological and psychosocial theories); COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFL1N,
supra note 99, at 70-76 (summarizing literature).
105 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 558-60; COHEN-KETTENIS &
PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 76-83. See also Milton Diamond et al., Atypical Gender
Development - A Review, INT'L J. TRANSSEXUALITY (forthcoming 2005). The court
commented on the etiology of Alex's condition, "[i]t has its most likely origins in
Alex's biological and psychological developmental features." Re Alex (2004) 180
Fam. L. R.. 89, 125, available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/judge/2004/html/
realex.html. In many instances of sex related matters males typically show a stronger
genetic component to their behavior than do females, e.g., in the display of homosex-
ual behavior. See Fredrick Whitam et al., Homosexual Orientation in Twins: A Re-
port On 61 Pairs and Three Triplet Sets, 22 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 187 (1993)
(discussing the display of transsexuality among twins). Milton Diamond & Skyler
Hawk, Transsexuality Among Twins, Presented Before the American Psychological
Association (Honolulu Hawaii July 31, 2004).
106 COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 106.
[Vol. 15:239
TREATING GENDER NONCONFORMITY
typical and atypical gender identification and behaviors existing along
a spectrum. For instance, "[i]n the more extreme cases [diagnosis]
will not be a very difficult task. However, children may take a posi-
tion anywhere between 'typical for boys' or 'typical for girls' on vari-
ous dimensions."' 0 7 A diagnostician must distinguish between merely
atypical gender manifestations that remain within the "normal
range."' 0 8 Compounding the difficulties of diagnosis even further,
some children with GID keep their cross gender feelings secret and
are not diagnosed until adolescence. 10 9
Treatment of childhood GID has evoked considerable contro-
versy. First, the diagnosis can be elusive because gender nonconform-
ity does not always constitute GID, and for some children, it appears
self-limiting. The various treatment options have not been tested, so
there is the concern of subjecting children to financially costly treat-
ment that might be pointless, or worse, harmful. Finally, depending
on what outcome is desired, the treatment goal may itself raise ethical
issues.
In childhood, empirical studies demonstrate gender identity is not
static and children diagnosed with GID may not be so as adults."0 In
fact, in the majority of children, GID "remits by adolescence, if not
earlier.""' Follow-up studies of boys who have GID indicate that "a
desistance of GID with a co-occurring homosexual orientation is the
most common" outcome, 112 while GID may persist into adulthood forothers, and for still others may desist "with a co-occurring heterosex-
107 Id.
108 Id. See also Lev, supra note 93, at 177-8 1.
109 COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 106 ("Retrospective ac-
counts of adolescents with GID make clear that cross-gender feelings, fantasies, and
sometimes even behaviors have persisted [from early childhood] until after puberty
without others being aware of it.").
"10 Children with GID "display an array of sex-typed behaviour signaling a
strong psychological identification with the opposite sex." The behaviors may in-
clude:
1. identity statements;
2. dress-up play;
3. toy play;
4. roles in play fantasy;
5. peer relations;
6. motoric and speech characteristics;
7. statements about sexual anatomy; and
8. involvement in rough and tumble play.
Zucker, Gender Identity Disorder, supra note 98, at 737.
i" Id. at 747.
112 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 556 (citing RICHARD GREEN,
THE "SissyBoy SYNDROME" AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1987)).
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ual sexual orientation."' 13 Less is known about the outcome in girls
because "insufficient numbers of girls with GID have been followed
prospectively to draw conclusions about long-term outcome."
' 14
There is some professional thought that intervention with young
children can alleviate GID, although this treatment option is not with-
out critics." 15 Certainly some proponents of early intervention justify
it based upon a religious or moral conservatism.1 6 In response to the
Re Alex decision, religious factions were among the more vocal in
expressing objection to the court's decision to allow treatment facili-
tating transition.' 17  But others, such as Zucker, acknowledge the
complexity of early treatment decisions and assert that treating GID
remains an ethical choice in certain cases:
Any contemporary child clinician responsible for the thera-
peutic care of children and adolescents with GID will quickly
be introduced to complex social and ethical issues pertaining
to the politics of sex and gender in a post-modem Western
culture and have to think them through carefully ..... If par-
ents request treatment for their child with GID to divert the
probability of a later homosexual orientation, what is the ap-
propriate clinical response?
113 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 556. Zucker reports that
"[m]uch less is known about the long-term outcome of girls who have GID." He
notes in his own clinic the outcomes are variable among girls as well. Id.
114 Zucker, Gender Identity Disorder, supra note 98, at 746. HBIGDA Stan-
dards of Care explain, "[t]here is greater fluidity and variability in outcomes, espe-
cially in pre-pubertal children. Only a few gender variant youths become transsexual,
although many eventually develop a homosexual orientation." HBIGDA SOC, supra
note 95.
1t5 See LEV, supra note 93, at 177-81. For a broad discussion of GID treat-
ment in children, see id. at 317-29.
116 For example, George A. Rekers, a professor of psychiatry at the University
of South Carolina is a proponent of intervention in childhood GID based in part on his
Christian beliefs that both transsexuality and homosexuality are pathological. He
explains his views in a Christian Leadership Ministries article, available at
http://www.leaderu.com/jhs/rekers.html. See also COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN,
supra note 99, at 120.
117 One of the most vocal opponents to the decision was Roman Catholic
ethicist Nicholas Tonti-Filipini who objected saying "[tihis medical treatment [is]
completely unproven .... To do it to a 13-year-old who is still in formation, whose
body is still forming, whose sense of identity is still forming, it's just irresponsible."
BBC News, Sex Change for Australian Child, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/
asia-pacific/3624891.stm (last updated Apr. 14, 2004). Tonti-Filipini is also quoted
as saying on an Australian Broadcasting Corporation program "I think [this case] was
set up by the Government Department. You can't get six medical experts with such
agreement unless somebody sets it up." The 7:30 Report, supra note 6.
[Vol. 15:239
TREATING GENDER NONCONFORMITY
Perhaps the most acute ethical issue concerns the relations be-
tween GID and a later homosexual orientation. As noted earlier, fol-
low-up studies of boys with GID, largely untreated, indicate that ho-
mosexuality is the most common long-term psychosexual outcome.
Some parents of children with GID request treatment, partly with an
eye towards preventing subsequent homosexuality in their child,
whether this is because of personal values, concerns about stigmatiza-
tion, or for other reasons." 
8
Zucker points out that it "has [not] been shown that any form of
treatment for GID during childhood affects later sexual orientation"
and "[f]rom an ethical standpoint.., the clinician has an obligation to
inform parents about the state of the empiric database.""l 9 Zucker
also cautions that the clinician must explain the "distinctness" of sex-
ual orientation and gender identity in their "[p]sychoeducational work
with parents., 120 Yet, because it is beneficial to assist children with
GID "to resolve the conflicts that are associated with the disorder,
regardless of the child's eventual sexual orientation," treatment is
appropriate.' 2 1 On balance, Zucker opines that "[m]ost clinicians,
therefore, take the position that therapeutics that are designed to re-
duce the gender dysphoria, lessen the degree of social ostracism, and
reduce the degree of psychiatric comorbidity constitute legitimate
goals of intervention.
122
Therapy can include such things as helping parents create oppor-
tunities for the child to experience successful gender conforming ex-
periences, develop same sex friendships, and develop a closer rela-
tionship with the same sex parent. 23 It might also include behaviormodification that results in "reinforcement of gender-typical behavior
118 Zucker, Gender Identity Disorder, supra note 99, at 748.
119 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 563.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. See also COHEN-KETENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 120.
123 See Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 100, at 563-64 (describing therapy
with parents, "limit-setting" of cross gender behaviors, exploring contributing factors;
encouraging same sex peer relations, among some techniques); COHEN-KETrENiS &
PFAFFLrN, supra note 99, at 122-25 (describing treatments that focus on family dy-
namics and altering the environment and parental approaches to encourage gender
typical behavior through positive experiences). Cohen-Kettenis & Pfdffiin's approach
focuses on factors "related to the child's suffering or malfunctioning." They do not
advise prohibiting cross dressing. At the same time, they regard it as beneficial to
enable children "to have social relationships with both boys and girls" and to encour-
age children with GID "to play with same-sex peers," and to "develop broader, per-
haps neutral, interests." Id. at 124-25. They may advise parents to limit cross-
dressing to the home "to protect the child from being harassed" or to "keep [] them in
the reality of their daily world." Id.
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during therapy sessions and extinction of cross-gender behavior,
gradual shaping of gender-typical behavior, and desensitizing fear of
failure."'
124
However, the efficacy of treatment is currently uncertain as
Zucker acknowledges:
For children who have GID, clinical experience suggests that
psychosocial treatments can be effective in reducing the gen-
der dysphoria .. . .In considering these various therapeutic
approaches, one important sobering fact should be contem-
plated. With the exception of a series of intrasubject behavior
therapy case reports from the 1970s, no randomized con-
trolled treatment trial can be found in the literature. Thus, the
treating clinician must rely largely on the 'clinical wisdom'
that has accumulated in the case report literature and the con-
ceptual underpinnings that inform the various approaches to
intervention. 125
There is no consensus concerning treatment of childhood GID aimed
at preventing either adult GID or homosexuality. For instance,
"[s]ome therapists treat the children to prevent homosexuality ...
[while] [m]any [therapists and others] consider this to be unethical,
because homosexuality is not a psychiatric disorder."'' 26  Moreover,
with so little scientific support of the efficacy of treatment, some
question whether treatment to cure GID can be justified under any
circumstance:
Despite the many treatment approaches, controlled studies do
not exist. It is therefore still unclear whether (an extreme)
GID in childhood can truly be cured. Whether homosexuality
or transsexualism can be prevented by psychological interven-
tions before puberty also remains to be demonstrated. Noth-
ing is known about the relative effectiveness of various treat-
ment methods .... Pending controlled studies, psychotherapy
directly aimed at curing GID has no place in the treatment ar-
senal. 2
7
124 COHEN-KETTENis & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 121 (citing work of
George Rekers).
125 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 563. See also COHEN-
KETrENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 98, at 129.
126 COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 128-29.
127 Id. at 129.
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Some commentators argue that it is society's treatment of those
with nonconforming gender or orientation that is pathological and
children expressing nonconformity do not have a disorder. Therefore,
they argue, in children with GID, it is better to try to reduce social
stigma and treat symptoms such as depression, rather than treating
GID. Law professor Elvia R. Arriola criticizes early intervention in
GID geared to guiding children toward heterosexuality, arguing in-
stead that society should commit itself "to undoing the belief systems
that keep people in what Warren Blumenfeld calls 'gender envelopes,'
which inhibit our personal growth and our potential for living happy
and creative lives."' 28 Because studies show that many children who
are diagnosed with GID eventually prefer homosexual activities, she
argues that treating these children with a goal to have them become
heterosexually oriented adults perpetuates the view that homosexual-
ity is a mental disorder. She argues that society should accept atypical
gender presentations; that they are not pathological. Moreover, she
argues that since homosexuality is not a recognized disorder, it is un-
ethical to treat GID, since it is often merely a precursor to homosexu-
ality. She argues that "the current availability of a mental health di-
agnosis of GID ... replaces the forms of reparative therapies 129 sup-
posedly set aside when homosexuality was removed from the official
list of mental disorders in 1973 and therefore the basis of GID is bla-
tantly homophobic."' 3 °
The Harry Benjamin Standards of Care acknowledges the possi-
bility of intervening to affect outcome but stops short of endorsing
treatment aimed at "curing" GID, stating "[t]he younger the child the
less certain and perhaps more malleable the outcome."' 31 In treating
children, its Standards of Care advise attending more to psychosocial
issues surrounding the diagnosis, rather than offering a clear prescrip-
tion for treating it.'
32
128 Elvia R. Arriola, The Penalties for Puppy Love: Institutionalized Violence
Against Lesbian, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 429, 469-70 (1998). See also Lev, supra
note 93, at 175-77.
129 Reparative therapies are those practices aimed at changing an individual
from homosexual to heterosexual orientation. For an extensive consideration of the
pros and cons of "reparative therapy" see Symposium, 32 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.
399 (2003) (issue devoted to studies related to efficacy of "reparative therapy").
130 Arriola, supra note 128, at 457.
131 HBIGDA SOC, supra note 95.
132 The Standards of Care state:
Psychological and Social Interventions. The task of the child-specialist
mental health professional is to provide assessment and treatment that
broadly conforms to the following guidelines:
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No one disputes that, at the very least, the psychological distress,
stigma, interpersonal difficulties, and depression associated with GID
should be treated. Cohen-Kettenis and Pfafflin write: "[E]ven thera-
pists of opposing backgrounds will agree that certain forms of suffer-
ing should be alleviated under all circumstances. Such distress may
come from social ostracism, non-GID psychiatric or family problems,
or intense unhappiness about one's sex characteristics and being a boy
or a girl." 133  Co-existing problems might even be of greater concern
than those associated with gender. 
134
One final problem with diagnosing a child or adolescent with GID
as stipulated in the DSM is that the individual becomes labeled as
having a mental disease. The stigma alone can have deleterious ef-
fects.
B. GID in Adolescents
Gender becomes less fluid in adolescence; nevertheless the even-
tual outcome for adolescents with GID still cannot be predicted with
1. The professional should recognize and accept the gender identity
problem. Acceptance and removal of secrecy can bring consider-
able relief.
2. The assessment should explore the nature and characteristics of the
child's or adolescent's gender identity. A complete psychodiag-
nostic and psychiatric assessment should be performed. A com-
plete assessment should include a family evaluation, because other
emotional and behavioral problems are very common, and unre-
solved issues in the child's environment are often present.
3. Therapy should focus on ameliorating any comorbid problems in
the child's life, and on reducing distress the child experiences from
his or her gender identity problem and other difficulties. The child
and family should be supported in making difficult decisions re-
garding the extent to which to allow the child to assume a gender
role consistent with his or her gender identity. This includes issues
of whether to inform others of the child's situation, and how others
in the child's life should respond; for example, whether the child
should attend school using a name and clothing opposite to his or
her sex of assignment. They should also be supported in tolerating
uncertainty and anxiety in relation to the child's gender expression
and how best to manage it. Professional network meetings can be
very useful in finding appropriate solutions to these problems.
Id.
133 COHEN-KETrENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 121. See also Zucker,
Gender Identity Disorder, supra note 99, at 748 (finding similar sources of distress).
134 See Ritch C. Savin-Williams & Kenneth M. Cohen, Homoerotic Develop-
ment During Childhood and Adolescence, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATIC
CLINICS OF N. AM. 529, 529-51 (2004) (discussing treating individuals with homosex-
ual orientation and commenting "[e]ffective clinicians recognize that homosexuality
does not lead to pathology (society's reaction to it does)").
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certainty. Studies reveal that "there is a considerable narrowing of
[gender] plasticity with age, with regard to long-term gender identity
differentiation."' 35 The apparent fluidity of gender identity in child-
hood, even into adolescence (albeit to a lesser degree), coupled with
inadequate empirical studies to predict outcome and establish reliable
treatment necessarily justifies a relatively cautious approach in treat-
ing adolescents as well as children.1 36  Another crucial factor, not
mentioned before, needs be taken into account. It is now not uncom-
mon for many diagnosed with GID when adolescents to elect to live
as transsexuals without surgery as adults.137 Thus, treatment plans for
adolescents need not assume surgery will be the desired end result.
As with children, the ethical issues of whether and how to treat
adolescents is made difficult by the lack of solid research. But in ado-
lescents, the issue is not how to "prevent GID" but how much to fa-
cilitate the gender transition. Zucker describes the difficulties of de-
ciding when to treat adolescents: "Although early hormonal treatment
is controversial, it may be the treatment of choice after the clinician is
confident that other options have been exhausted.' 38  Importantly,
clinicians must explore sexual orientation with their adolescent pa-
tients and help them to determine whether GID treatment is truly de-
sirable. 1
39
The HBIGDA Standards of Care allow in some cases more proac-
tive medical interventions for adolescents, including both reversible
and partially reversible (nonsurgical) interventions. The Standards of
Care caution: "Before any physical intervention is considered, exten-
sive exploration of psychological, family and social issues should be
undertaken." Furthermore, it cautions that gender identity remains
changeable and unsettled, "[i]dentity beliefs in adolescents may be-
come firmly held and strongly expressed, giving a false impression of
irreversibility; more fluidity may return at a later stage.'1
40
Treatment in adolescents is divided into three stages: reversible,
puberty-delaying treatment; irreversible hormonal treatment; and sur-
gical interventions. As to surgery, HBIGDA states that this should be
delayed until the age of majority.' 4 1
Reversible treatment, according to HBIGDA is designed to delay
puberty. The standard of care permits "puberty-delaying hormones as
135 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 557.
136 Zucker, Gender Identity Disorders, supra note 99, at 749-50.
137 Milton Diamond, What's In a Name? Some Terms Used In the Discussion
of Sex and Gender, 102 TRANSGENDER TAPESTRY J. 19 (2003).
138 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 565.
139 Id.
140 HBIGDA SOC, supra note 95.
141 ,,4
2005]
HEALTHMATRIX
soon as pubertal changes have begun."' 142 HBIGDA explains the justi-
fication for reversible treatment:
Two goals justify this intervention: a) to gain time to further
explore the gender identity and other developmental issues in
psychotherapy; and b) to make passing easier if the adolescent
continues to pursue sex and gender change. 143
For some adolescents who are trying to make a transition, early
treatment may help facilitate their psychological and social adjust-
ment. Offering reversible puberty-delaying treatment may help to
alleviate the adolescent's discomfort at the prospect of developing
unwanted sex characteristics. 144 It makes it easier to socially pass in
the identified gender. 145 It delays pubertal changes and so makes a
later transition surgically and psychologically easier. 46 Moreover, it
can help to confirm the diagnosis; delaying puberty "gain[s] time to
further explore the gender identity and other developmental issues"
while keeping the maturing adolescent's options open.
147
HBIGDA Standards of Care also accept that "partially reversible
interventions" may be instituted in 16 year-olds with certain safe-
142 Id. For puberty delay it advises, "[b]iologic males should be treated with
LHRH agonists (which stop LH secretion and therefore testosterone secretion), or
with progestins or antiandrogens (which block testosterone secretion or neutralize
testosterone action). Biologic females should be treated with LHRH agonists or with
sufficient progestins (which stop the production of estrogens and progesterone) to
stop menstruation." Id.
143 The SOC criteria for eligibility for reversible treatment state:
In order to provide puberty delaying hormones to an adolescent, the follow-
ing criteria must be met:
I. throughout childhood the adolescent has demonstrated an in-
tense pattern of cross-sex and cross-gender identity and aversion
to expected gender role behaviors;
2. sex and gender discomfort has significantly increased with the
onset of puberty;
3. the family consents and participates in the therapy.
Id.
144 See generally COHEN-KETTENIS & PFFFLIN, supra note 99, at 144-46.
Clinical judgment is essential in determining which adolescents should have treat-
ment. Id. In order to be informed and to test the diagnosis, most clinicians recom-
mend allowing the adolescent to experience at least some pubertal change. Id. at 145.
145 Id. For anatomic males, medication can suppress "facial hair growth and
voice deepening, which make it more difficult to pass in the female social role."
Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 565.
146 See COHEN-KETrENIS & PFAFFL1N, supra note 99, at 140-41; Zucker, Gen-
der Identity, supra note 101, at 565.
147 COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 145.
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guards.1 48 HBIGDA does not recommend surgical (irreversible) in-
terventions until adulthood, and then only after the two-year real-life
experience (RLE) 149 has been completed:
Irreversible Interventions. Any surgical intervention should
not be carried out prior to adulthood, or prior to a real-life ex-
perience of at least two years in the gender role of the sex
with which the adolescent identifies. The threshold of 18
should be seen as an eligibility criterion and not an indication
in itself for active intervention. 150
However, a recent assessment of reported studies on surgical out-
comes by a health technology assessment group in New Zealand con-
cluded that while studies to date were quite limited, there was some
indication that earlier surgery had a better outcome:
The quality of the evidence is poor and based on a small
number of studies with weak study designs and significant
methodological limitations.
The reviewed studies may indicate that early, rather than de-
layed, sex reassignment surgery is of greater benefit to trans-
148 The Standards of Care state:
Partially Reversible Interventions. Adolescents may be eligible to begin
masculinizing or feminizing hormone therapy, as early as age 16, preferably
with parental consent. In many countries 16-year olds are legal adults for
medical decision-making, and do not require parental consent.
Mental health professional involvement is an eligibility requirement for tri-
adic therapy during adolescence. For the implementation of the real-life
experience or hormone therapy, the mental health professional should be
involved with the patient and family for a minimum of six months. While
the number of sessions during this six-month period rests upon the clini-
cian's judgment, the intent is that hormones and the real-life experience be
thoughtfully and recurrently considered over time. In those patients who
have already begun the real-life experience prior to being seen, the profes-
sional should work closely with them and their families with the thoughtful
recurrent consideration of what is happening over time.
HBIGDA SOC, supra note 95.
149 This is often called the "real-life test" (RLT) since therapists require it be
managed satisfactorily before they will consider recommending surgery. The RLE
requires that the individual live completely and full-time as a member of the desired
gender. There is some flexibility in the duration required depending upon the indi-
vidual and therapist.
150 HBIGDA SOC, supra note 95.
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sexual people who have gone through rigorous assessment
procedures and have been accepted for surgery.'
51
Thus it may be that a "too cautious" approach can have its own nega-
tive consequences to the outcome.
152
Currently, whether and how to treat children and adolescents dis-
playing gender identity disorders involves making an individualized
clinical judgment.'53 The HBIGDA Standards of Care offers guidance
to physicians, rather than any clear criteria for treating any particular
individual. Moreover, the Standards of Care acknowledge the "limita-
tions of knowledge" in treating children and adolescents and the need
for further research. 54 The recent New Zealand review of studies,
however, may lend some support for early surgery.
C. Alex's Treatment Conforms to Standard Care
In Alex's case, the treatment proposed fell within the HBIGDA
Standards of Care. First, the treatment proposed began with fully
reversible hormone blocking treatment. Second, it would allow Alex
to receive partially reversible hormonal medication at the age of six-
teen, allowing him time to mature and to determine whether he
151 PETER DAY, NEW ZEALAND HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECH
BRIEF SERIES: TRANS-GENDER REASSIGNMENT SURGERY ii (Feb. 2002), available at
http://nzhta.chmeds.ac.nz/. It comments, "[flinally, the study by Smith et al. (2001)
showed that adolescent transsexuals (both M to F and F to M) post-operatively re-
solved their gender dysphoria, body dissatisfaction and psychological functioning
better than those (now older) who as adolescents were not approved for treatment."
Id. at 13. See also COHEN-KETENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 179 (characteriz-
ing age 18 as "arbitrary" rather than as "intrinsically good for SR applicants").
152 Cosmetic elective surgery obtained by minors is not uncommon in the
United States in instances other than transsexual considerations. According to the
American Society of Plastic Surgeons the number of cosmetic surgeries performed on
people under the age of 18 exceeded 74,000 in 2003, a fourteen percent increase from
2000. In 2003 some 3,700 breast augmentation surgeries were performed on teenage
girls and almost as many teenage boys had their breasts reduced. A study of patients
from twelve to twenty-two years of age from Erasmus University in Rotterdam in the
Netherlands asked about their body image and reasons for their surgeries. These
respondents reported that after the survey they were no longer concerned about their
appearance and felt more self-confident. In contrast, a control group of young people
who were dissatisfied with their appearance but who did not have surgery did not
develop a better self-image or gain self-confidence with time. Mary Duenwald, The
Consumer; How Young Is Too Young to have a Nose Job and Breast Implants, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at F5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/28/health/
28cons.html. Males and females, thus, are denied surgery only if it is associated with
a desire to change their sex, not if it is to enhance gender stereotypes.
153 Zucker, Gender Identity, supra note 101, at 564-66.
154 HBIGDA SOC, supra note 95.
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wanted to continue the course of treatment. Third, the treatment was
not objectionable to Alex or his guardian. Fourth, the plan did not
neglect Alex's psychosocial needs and helped him to make a success-
ful transition. Finally, the court did not authorize surgical treatment
prior to Alex reaching the age of majority.'
Although the care afforded Alex conforms to standard care, the
case is nevertheless important and noteworthy. Alex's case offers a
rare and comprehensive view into the life of a transsexual minor. 156 A
few generalizations are evident. Developmentally, the gender and
sexual orientation of children and even young adolescents remains in
flux and treatment must therefore be well considered and cautious.
There is urgency to the need to treat them, however, because psycho-
logical distress, depression, and suicide are real risks. The legal status
of children and adolescents and their lack of maturation may prevent
them from consenting to treatment but their wishes must be valued
and respected. Society can be intolerant to gender incongruity and
adults must take responsibility for removing stigma and ostracism.
The condition is mysterious, rare, and complicated, so experts must be
consulted for diagnosis and treatment. Treatment in every case must
be individualized and responsive. For all these reasons, these youth
are in for a difficult and protracted struggle that will require them to
have the support of adults and social institutions.
The judge's approach to Alex was extraordinary, exemplary,
compassionate, cautious, and well-informed. He was not bogged
down with rhetoric of gender construction. Alex's dignity, best inter-
est, current needs and future potentiality were the court's only con-
cerns.
The role this judge assumed was equally extraordinary. In Judge
Nicholson, Alex found a father with whom to share the burden of this
monumental personal decision. It was as though the judge sat with
Alex at the kitchen table and asked the questions a good parent might
ask of the child and of the medical experts, in deciding what course to
follow.
155 But see Duenwald, supra note 153, (quoting comments of Dr. Steven J.
Pearlman, President of the American Academy of Facial, Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgery, "[b]y the age of 6, kids can participate in the decision to have surgery and
understand why it is being done.").
156 A good glimpse into some aspects of the life of transgender youth was
conducted in 2001. MAiNE GENDER RES. & SUPPORT SERV., TRANSGENDER YOUTH
SuRVEY (2001) (on file with the authors) (conducted to gain information for mental
health professionals, school officials and other professionals that deal with youth).
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IV. THE COURT'S ROLE IN THE UNITED STATES
Although no published cases have considered the appropriateness
of hormonal interventions, there have been surprising glimmers of
such understanding in judicial decisions in the United States consider-
ing "real life" treatment of adolescent GID.157 The lack of cases may
157 Under Australian law, in order to treat Alex, prior judicial approval was
required because Alex lacked capacity to give legal consent and the "scope of paren-
tal power to consent" to certain medical procedures is limited. "[C]ourt authorization
is required firstly because of the significant risk of making the wrong decision and
secondly because the consequences of a wrong decision are particularly grave." Re
Alex (2004) 180 Fam. L. R.. 89, 120, available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/
judge/2004/htinl/realex.html (citing In the Marriage of GWW & CMW (1997) 21
Fam. L. R. 612 (bone marrow donation)). The court concluded that Alex's proposed
treatment fell within that limitation on consent.
There is generally no such categorical requirement in the United States.
Most medical decision cases arise where there is a conflict among parties. See, e.g.,
Rosebush v. Oakland County Prosecutor, 491 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992) ("We hold that the decision-making process should generally occur in the clini-
cal setting without resort to the courts, but that courts should be available to assist in
decision making when an impasse is reached."); In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992)
(holding that hospital had standing to seek guidance where mother and father dis-
agreed on "do not resuscitate" orders for their daughter).
Some courts and state laws have required prior judicial approval for cer-
tain specific medical treatments of children and incompetents or where parent and
child interests may be in conflict. "[C]ategorical conflicts have been found to exist in
types of cases where the risk of conflict is so high that court intervention is deemed
necessary." Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Par-
ents Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?,
73 TEMPLE L. REv. 1, 43 (2000) (discussing categories of medical decisions where
courts do not accord parents deference, including "extraordinary medical treatment"
such as sterilization); see also Charles H. Baron, Medicine and Human Rights:
Emerging Substantive Standards and Procedural Protections for Medical Decision
Making Within the American Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 1, 7-9 (1983) (describing scenar-
ios where parent and child interests conflict and prior judicial approval is required).
Due process concerns also justify seeking prior judicial approval before certain treat-
ments. Rosato, supra, at 45. See, e.g., In re A.M.P., 708 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999) (approving electroshock therapy to be administered to psychotic teen at par-
ent's behest and on recommendation of the psychiatrist).
Sterilization of children and incompetents is one notable exception where,
by statute or common law, prior judicial approval is required when it is allowed at all.
See, e.g., Little, NCM v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 497-98 (Tex. App. 1979). See gen-
erally ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMrrs: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETt-CAL DECISION
MAKING 54-60 (1996) (approving the increasingly adopted judicial case-by-case
approach in involuntary sterilization cases); Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization
of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 122 (1993) (describing
statutory and case law approaches to sterilization of mentally disabled); and Elizabeth
Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and Family
Privacy, 1986 DuKE L.J. 806, 818 (noting "most laws ... embody strict procedural
and substantive requirements that create a strong presumption against sterilization").
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be because few centers treat adolescents with hormones, or because
such decisions need not go to court in the United States.158 Neverthe-
less, the several courts confronting issues related to enforcing dress
codes, which have had the effect of thwarting psychiatrically ap-
proved treatment plans of gender variant youth, have supported the
adolescent in suits against educational and residential institutions. 5 9
These cases have been brought based upon state laws prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of disability.160 In each, judges have recog-
Some jurisdictions require prior judicial approval for non-therapeutic
medical procedures. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst. Inc., 782 A.2d 807
(Md. App. 2001) (holding that parents may not consent to minor's participation in
nontherapeutic research involving greater than minimal risk without judicial ap-
proval); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (allowing kidney
donation between identical twins, and establishing judicial role, explaining "natural
parents of a minor should have the right to give their consent to an isograft kidney
transplantation procedure when their motivation and reasoning are favorably re-
viewed by a community representation which includes a court of equity").
15s See COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 99, at 168 (observing that
"[t]here are very few specialized treatment centers for GID in children and adoles-
cents").
159 See Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (holding that a
foster care facility unlawfully discriminated against a seventeen year-old biological
male resident, who identifies as a female, by keeping him from wearing skirts pursu-
ant to the facility's dress code); Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947
(Mass. Super. Feb. 26, 2001).
160 Unlike homosexuality, transsexualism may be regarded as a disorder or
disability under state anti-discrimination laws. The medicalization of nonconforming
gender identity is, at best, controversial. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See also Jennifer L. Nye, The Gender Box, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 226, 236-37
(1998) (discussing and critiquing the medicalization of transsexuality). She notes "a
movement has arisen within the transgender community to depathologize transsexual-
ity and to declassify Gender Identity Disorder as a mental disorder." Id. at 237.
Nevertheless, and at least for now, regarding it as a disorder has provided some courts
a vehicle by which to protect, support, and advance the rights of transsexuals. For
example, a number of courts have held that health insurers and government providers
must cover treatment. See, e.g., Davidson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 420
N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that male to female sex reassign-
ment is not excluded as cosmetic surgery under a health insurance policy); Pinneke v.
Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the only surgery available
for transsexuals cannot be denied under Medicaid); J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr.
570, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that radical sex conversion surgery was not
cosmetic and must be covered by Medi-Cal); Doe v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257
N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 1977) (holding that transsexual surgery cannot be totally
excluded from state medical assistance benefits); M.K. v. Div. of Med. Assistance &
Health Servs., No. DMA 2345-91, 1992 WL 280789 (N.J. Adm. May 7, 1992) (hold-
ing that phalloplasty is medically necessary because it is the only available treatment
for transsexualism and therefore, should be covered by Medicaid). See generally
Jerry Dasti, Note, Advocating a Broader Understanding of the Necessity of Sex-
Reassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1738, 1743 (2002) (argu-
ing for a broader construction of medically necessary that provides coverage for
20051
HEALTH MA TR[X
nized that GID is not a lifestyle or behavior choice but the response to
an inner compulsion dictating one's gender behaviors.
In Doe v. Yunits,161 a school district dress code prevented Pat Doe,
a biologic male fifteen year-old eighth grade student, from wearing
female clothing or accessories to school. Doe challenged the dress
code, claiming that it constituted discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability under the Massachusetts Constitution, 62 among other claims.
The court denied the public school's motion to dismiss, concluding
that GID did constitute a handicap as defined by Massachusetts's
law. 63 The school also moved for dismissal of the claim that it had
constructively expelled her by refusing to allow her to wear female
clothing. The court refused to dismiss Doe's claim that constructive
expulsion constituted a due process violation, reasoning that refusing
to allow Doe to wear female clothing was no different than forbidding
a diabetic to take insulin during the school day or demanding that a
five foot student not return to school until she were six feet.' 64 The
court noted that expert testimony supported Doe's allegation that "re-
quiring Doe to wear boy's clothing to school would be... injurious to
her psychiatric health."
'1 65
In Doe v. Bell,166 Jean Doe, a seventeen year-old diagnosed with
GID, had resided in foster care in New York State since the age of
transsexual treatment but removing the pathology stigma); Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex,
Sexual Pleasure and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don 't Want You to Do Those
Nasty Things, 13 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 152-59 (1998) (describing treatment cover-
age in private insurance, Medicaid and prison health care contexts).
161 No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947 (Mass. Super. Feb. 26, 2001). An earlier
preliminary injunction allowed Pat Doe to attend South Junior High in female attire.
The school had accommodated the student by allowing home schooling. The court
commented, "[T]his court trusts that exposing children to diversity at an early age
serves the important social goals of increasing their ability to tolerate such differences
and teaching them respect for everyone's unique personal experience in that "Brave
New World" out there." Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2000 WL 33162199 at *8
(Mass. Super. Oct. 11, 2000). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nabozny vs.
Podlesny, stated in 1996 that gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender youth are entitled
to receive equal protection from harassment in the school, from other youth and from
the faculty and administration. The school and the principal personally, can be held
liable if they fail in this obligation. Nabozny v. Podlesny 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
162 No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947 at *4 (Mass. Super. Feb. 26, 2001) (cit-
ing Mass. Const. art. CXIV).
163 The court noted that prior to a 1992 amendment to the Federal Rehabilita-
tion Act Section 504 specifically excluding "gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments," federal courts regarded GID as a disability. Id. at *3
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i)).
'64 Id. at * 6.
165 Id. at *6.
"6 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
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nine. She had a persistent and intense "need to wear women's cloth-
ing and act as a woman." The court considered the testimony of her
psychiatrist and an expert on the treatment and its rationale:
[T]he treatment plan for Jean Doe called for Doe to dress ac-
cording to her identity as a woman, including "wearing girls'
clothing, accessories, and makeup, and sometimes other items
to make [herself] look ... more feminine, such as breast en-
hancers." Dr. Spritz explained the reason for such treatment:
"[t]he goal is to facilitate acceptance of the gender identity of
a transgendered person by allowing her to dress in a manner
consistent with her internal identity .... Research has found
that forcing youths with GID to dress in conflict with their
identity, though it may be in harmony with their biological at-
tributes, causes significant anxiety, psychological harm, and
antisocial behavior." Her opinion was seconded by Gerald P.
Mallon, Phd., a Professor at the Hunter College School of So-
cial Work and founder of the Green Chimneys, Children Ser-
vices Program for, inter alia, transgendered youth, who ex-
pressed the opinion that "[t]he proper course of treatment for
transgendered boys is to allow them to wear feminine clothing
in an integrated environment."
' 167
Jean had earlier been placed in "two group homes for gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered youth" but had been discharged from
each for misconduct. 168  As the court described her: "Jean Doe does
have a history of being insubordinate, undisciplined, and on occasion
has been involved in violent altercations during her sojourn through
many foster homes, group homes and institutions.1 69 Jean was then
placed in an all male facility, Atlantic Transitional. Atlantic Transi-
tional restricted her clothing options. For example, its director "issued
a memorandum to the staff explaining that Jean Doe was not permit-
ted 'to wear 'female attire' in the facility. He can wear it only if he is
walking directly out of the facility. If he returns to the facility, he
must be escorted to his room so he can remove the female attire."",
170
Following a motion for a preliminary injunction, Atlantic Transitional
modified its policy to allow female attire, but not skirts and dresses,
providing that "'[r]esidents who wish to wear female attire may do so
as long as the above guidelines are respected. Female attire that does
167 Id. at 848-49.
168 Id. at 849.
169 Id.
170 id.
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not conform to the policy may only be worn by a resident when leav-
ing facility premises."'
171
At issue was whether, under New York State Human Rights Law,
the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) and Atlantic Transi-
tional Foster Facility discriminated against Doe by enforcing a dress
code that prohibited Doe from wearing dresses and skirts. The court
first considered whether Jean was a disabled person under the protec-
tions of the law. The court noted that New York law defines disability
broadly, to include any "medically diagnosable impairment" that is
"demonstrable by medically accepted techniques" even if that im-
pairment does not "substantially limit that individual's normal activi-
ties. ' 72 It therefore held that Doe suffered a disability under New
York Law. 173  The court also held that Atlantic Transitional failed to
reasonably accommodate her disability by not exempting her from the
dress code. It explained:
The evidence before the Court establishes that, because of her
disability, Jean Doe experiences significant emotional distress
if denied the right to wear such feminine clothing. Indeed, the
treatment she has received for her GID calls for her to wear
feminine clothing, including dresses and skirts. Granting her
an exemption from the dress policy avoids this psychological
distress. Moreover, it allows Ms. Doe the equal opportunity
to use and enjoy the facilities at Atlantic Transitional - a right
that would be denied to her if forced to endure psychological
distress as a result of the ACS's dress policy.' 74
The court also rejected Atlantic Transitional's argument that per-
mitting Doe to wear feminine attire "would jeopardize the safety of
the residents and staff' and "threaten the safety and security of the
institution."' 75 The court discounted "[t]he premise of respondents'
argument that cross-dressing by a resident can lead to unsafe sexual
behavior and other inappropriate conduct," pointing out that the facil-
ity already "allowed [Jean] to wear fake breasts, make-up, women's
blouses, scarves, nails, hair weaves and other female clothing.' ' 176 It
concluded: "There is simply no rational basis for treating dresses and
171 Id. at 850.
172 Id. at 851 (quoting Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 697,
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
173 Id. at 850.
17' Idat 853.
171 Id. at 854.
176 Id. at 855.
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skirts differently than the other feminine accoutrements which Jean
Doe may now wear." 
177
Atlantic Transitional, an all-male facility, argued that Jean Doe
was merely getting her "just desserts" because her own misconduct
had led to her expulsion from the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgen-
dered youth facility and placement in the all-male facility. Therefore,
she should not be entitled to complain about Atlantic Transitional's
rules. However, the court rejected its argument:
ACS's obligation to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion is not
satisfied merely by providing a small number of facilities at
which children with GID are assured nondiscriminatory
treatment. At each and every facility run and operated by
ACS, it must comply with the Human Right Law's mandate
to provide reasonable accommodations to persons with dis-
abilities. That Doe engaged in misconduct . . . gives no li-
cense to discriminate against her by denying her a reasonable
accommodation.
Neither of these cases involved a discussion of medical interven-
tions, but in each case the court supported and protected an adolescent
implementing a psychiatrically approved "real life" plan. These cases
challenged social institutions to tolerate and support gender variant
youth, rather than demanding conformity.
These and other cases where courts have stepped up to support
sexual minority youth 178 must be offset by the ever-present reality that
177 id.
178 There are other cases in which the rights of sexual minority youth have
been vindicated and safeguarded in court under equal protection, Title IX, or state
anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding homosexual youth could maintain an equal protection claim against school
officials and denying qualified immunity); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist.,
324 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (protecting sexual minority youth under the Equal
Protection Clause); Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081
(D. Minn. 2000) (denying school district's motions for summary judgment as to state,
federal statutory, and constitutional claims of discrimination based on student on
student taunting and abusive conduct over the course of ten years).
Courts have also protected sexual minority youth from misguided, abusive
or cruel parents. In re Shane T, 453 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982), is also
worth noting. There, the court agreed with the Commissioner of Social Services that
a fourteen year-old boy whose father referred to him as "fag," "faggot," and "queer"
and whose mother who was ineffective in preventing the verbal taunts had suffered
"substantial pain" and was abused. Id. at 591-92. The court there also showed sym-
pathy and tenderness to the child, calling him a "sensitive, handsome little boy." Id.
at 593. The father argued that this was "a form of legitimate parental discipline de-
signed to cure the child of certain unspecified 'girlie' behavior. He stated that it
would be embarrassing to him if Shane were 'queer."' Id.
2005]
HEAL TH MA TRIX
not all judges are so enlightened, perhaps especially so in the United
States.1 79 One need only consider the narrow and unscientific concept
of gender espoused in Kantaras v. Kantaras,"'8 Littleton v. Prange,'
In re Ladrach,l8 2 or In re Estate of Gardiner,18 3 to understand that not
The court responded,
It is very sad and even shocking that, at this late date in our constitutional
development, many parents continue to view their home as a kingdom
where they reign as king and queen and their children are relegated to the
role of indentured servants ....
The behavior of this respondent father is as serious a form of abuse as if he
had plunged a knife into the stomach of this child. In fact, it's probably
worse since the agony and heartache suffered by Shane has already assailed
him for several years and constitutes a grave and imminent threat to his fu-
ture psychological development.
Id. at 594. See also In re Lori M., 496 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985).
179 For example, one commentator wrote, "[w]hile countries all over the
world are moving towards full recognition of the post-operative status of transsexuals,
the United States remains in a stalemate, with some states granting full recognition
and others adhering to the strict rigidity of biological and chromosomal sex." Leslie
I. Lax, Is the United States Falling Behind? The Legal Recognition of Post-
Transsexuals' Acquired Sex in the United States and Abroad, 7 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH
L.J. 123, 150 (2003) (reviewing legal recognition of post-operative transsexuals in the
United States and elsewhere).
180 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct.. App. 2004)
(holding marriage void ab initio. In countering a lower court decision, "[w]e agree
with the Kansas, Ohio, and Texas courts in their understanding of the common mean-
ing of male and female, as those terms are used statutorily, to refer to immutable traits
determined at birth.").
181 In Littleton v. Prange, the issue was whether a postoperative male to fe-
male transsexual could pursue a wrongful death claim on behalf of her deceased hus-
band. The court held she could not, finding the marriage invalid as a same-sex mar-
riage:
Her female anatomy, however, is all man-made. The body that Christie in-
habits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have sup-
plied.
We recognize that there are many fine metaphysical arguments lurking
about here involving desire and being, the essence of life and the power of
mind over physics. But courts are wise not to wander too far into the misty
fields of sociological philosophy. Matters of the heart do not always fit
neatly within the narrowly defined perimeters of statutes, or even existing
social mores. Such matters though are beyond this court's consideration.
Our mandate is, as the court recognized in Ladrach, to interpret the statutes
of the state and prior judicial decisions. This mandate is deceptively sim-
plistic in this case: Texas statutes do not allow same-sex marriages, and
prior judicial decisions are few.
9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (citing In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio
Prob. Ct. 1987)).
182 513 N.E.2d 828, 831-32 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987) (court held that a post-
surgical male to female transsexual could not be married to a male, based on her sex
as determined at birth).
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all judges can transcend their own construction of gender and act as
courageously as Judge Nicholson did when asked to serve the needs
of the child. The hostility of schools, courts, social service agencies,
and even parents to sexual minority youth is well known.'8 4 Thus, it
is probably just as well that medical treatment decisions concerning
childhood and adolescent GID are not routinely put before the court.
However, when and if such a case comes to a United States judge, Re
Alex offers guidance on how to approach treatment issues and to serve
the child's best interests.
185
' 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). The Kansas Supreme Court denied J'Noel Gar-
diner, a post-operative male to female transsexual the intestate spousal share of her
husband's estate even though her Wisconsin birth certificate had been lawfully
amended to recognize her new status. Id. at 137. Remarkably, it relied on Black's
Law Dictionary and the Webster's Dictionary for a definition of male and female,
disregarding the complexity of sex differentiation in the intersexed or transsexual
individual in regard to, sexual orientation and gender identity:
The words "sex," "male," and "female" are words in common usage and
understood by the general population. Black's Law Dictionary, 1375 (6th
ed. 1999) defines "sex" as "[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female organism; the character of
being male or female." Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (2nd
ed. 1970) states the initial definition of sex as "either of the two divisions of
organisms distinguished as male or female; males or females (especially
men or women) collectively." "Male" is defined as "designating or of the
sex that fertilizes the ovum and begets offspring: opposed to female." "Fe-
male" is defined as "designating or of the sex that produces ova and bears
offspring: opposed to male." [Emphasis added.] According to Black's Law
Dictionary, 972 (6th ed. 1999) a marriage "is the legal status, condition, or
relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, or until divorced,
for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally in-
cumbent on those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex."
Id. at 135. Judge Robert Gernon, writing for the Court of Appeals of Kansas, on the
other hand, adopted a multi-factor test to determine sex that included "factors in addi-
tion to chromosome makeup, including: gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, exter-
nal morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex and gender of rear-
ing, and sexual identity." In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan. App.
2001). Moreover, Judge Gernon suggested that our definition of sex should continue
to be informed by science, commenting, "[t]he listed criteria we adopt as significant
in resolving the case before us should not preclude the consideration of other criteria
as science advances." Id.
184 See, e.g., Arriola, supra note 128; Miye A. Goishi, Unlocking the Closet
Door: Protecting Children From Involuntary Civil Commitment Because of Their
Sexual Orientation, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1137 (1997); Ruth Robson, Our Children: Kids
of Queer Parents & Kids Who Are Queer: Looking at Sexual Minority Rights From a
Different Perspective, 64 ALB. L. REV. 915 (2001) (describing specific incidences of
hostility from parents, the courts, social services, and schools toward sexual minority
youth).
185 Such a case recently came before a court in the United States. See Boy
Torn Over His Gender, STEUBENVILLE HERALD-STAR, Sept. 13, 2004, available at
http://hsconnect.com/news/story/0911202004_new03newsO91104.asp (last visited
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V. CONCLUSION
We have attempted to present some of the issues involved in Re
Alex, a case that came before the main Family Court of Australia, and
relate it to how similar issues might be dealt with in United States
courts. When all parties agree (individual, parents, guardian, thera-
pists) such decisions are typically made outside the legal system in the
United States, and we concur that treatment decisions in such cases
best remain a decision of parents, children, and doctors, guided by the
child's best interests and with due respect to the child's maturity.
Of note, Wallbank, the barrister who successfully argued the land-
mark Australian case Re Kevin, which established the right of a post-
operated transsexual to marry in the new sex, 186 criticized the conclu-
sion in Re Alex that these decisions must be brought to the Australian
courts. She has recently argued that once the diagnosis of GID is es-
tablished, it should be accepted for minors as it is for adults with the
result that remedial treatment is supported even without resort to the
courts. 187 Wallbank has observed that involving the courts only delays
treatment and adds considerably to the total cost.' 88
We agree with Wallbank that these decisions should be made pri-
vately when possible. However, when there is disagreement among
the parties, there is a role for family courts to see that all efforts are
directed toward satisfying the best interests of the minor. The ultimate
decisions, whether made by court or not, deserves consultation with
clinicians and others drawn from the ranks of experts qualified in
transsexual matters. When a court is drawn into these decisions,
Judge Nicholson's inquisitorial rather than adversarial approach is
certainly desirable. Courts considering these cases must take care, as
did Judge Nicholson, to preserve the privacy of the minor. Most
transsexuals do not seek publicity in their lives and public knowledge
Feb. 25, 2005) (describing the custody battle over a nine year old boy whose mother
believed he had GID and whose father did not want him to attend transgender support
group meetings or go to school dressed as a girl); Shelby Zarotney, Custody Battle
Involves Gender of Child, HEALTHYPLACE.COM, Sept. 19, 2004, at
http://www.healthyplace.com/Communities/gender/Site/story-gender identity-disord
er.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (reporting a dispute filed in Jefferson County Court
of Common Pleas, between parents over how to treat nine year old with GID). The
court ruled that the boy could not attend transgender support groups or enroll in
school as a female as the mother desired. See Ruling Made in Case of Gender Iden-
tity, STEUBENVILLE HERALD-STAR, Sept. 26, 2004, available at http://hsconnect.com/
news/story/0926202004_newO4newsO92504.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
186 Re Kevin: Validity of Marriage of Transsexual (2001) 28 Fam. L. R. 158.
187 Rachael Wallbank, Re Alex "Through a Looking Glass", AUSTL. CHILD.
RTS. NEWS, May 2004, at 28.
188 Id. at 35.
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of gender transition can have long-term effects in schooling, employ-
ment, insurance, 89 medical treatment, and in other regards.190 Judge
Nicholson's opinion is notable because he made sure that Alex's in-
terests were paramount and his interests were well represented. Fi-
nally, Judge Nicholson was also mindful of the child's environment
and was able to fashion his orders to facilitate Alex's transition.
In addition, in cases where there is disagreement, a court must ex-
amine the premises on which parents or others object to or seek par-
ticular treatment. While parents traditionally have substantial author-
ity to consent to medical treatment, parents should not be regarded as
having the authority to either force a child to submit to unsound, un-
proven, or unethical treatment that may cause harm, or to deny chil-
dren treatment that is in the child's best interest. When parental deci-
sions do not serve the child's interests the state has a right and obliga-
tion to intervene. 191
Like others, Wallbank also argued that the DSM IV, the Harry
Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, and their vari-
ous professional adherents in the fields of psychiatry and psychology,
are, though well intentioned, wrong in their association of the condi-
tions Gender Dysphoria/Gender Identity Disorder (or any form of
mental disorder or confusion) with transsexualism at any age and that,
in continuing to do so, retards the development of proper treatment
189 One individual diagnosed with GID lamented "I've been diagnosed [with
GID because] I requested this particular surgery. But it's no longer possible for me to
get private heath insurance. I cannot get life insurance. Nor can I get disability insur-
ance. Because every insurance application asks, "Have you ever been diagnosed with
a mental illness?" I have to answer, "Yes." And as soon as I do, I render myself
uninsurable." "[W]e [the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force] believe no one -
whether gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender or intersex (hermaphrodite) - should have
to accept being pathologized as mentally ill in order to attain wholeness, complete-
ness and civil equality." Jack Drescher, An Interview with GenderPAC's Riki
Wilchins, 6 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 67, 72 (2002).
190 See Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and
Heteronormativity, 10 L. & SEXUALITY 123, 133-35 (2001) (describing how public
knowledge of transgender status can have long range effects in medical care and other
regards).
191 See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medi-
cal Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with
Ambiguous Genitalia?, MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 39 n. 183 (2000) (noting that "the
state may intervene where parental decision making seemingly fails to adequately
protect the interests of the child."); Patrick Henigan, Note, Is Parental Authority
Absolute? Public High Schools Which Provide Gay and Lesbian Youth Services Do
Not Violate the Constitutional Childrearing Right of Parents, 62 BROOK. L. REv.
1261, 1270 (1996) (noting that the "state is able to interfere with parental control
whenever there is a compelling reason to protect children, and parental authority is
diminished in an effort to recognize the constitutional rights of children.").
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regimes for children and adolescents. 192 We agree that in a more in-
formed and tolerant society, variations in gender should not be re-
garded as mental disorders and doing so causes unnecessary stigmati-
zation. We should examine ways to bring these cases in the human
rights context rather than as disability discrimination cases on the ba-
sis of a mental disorder. Nevertheless, practically speaking, the classi-
fication of gender identity dysphoria as a disorder has allowed courts
to intervene to protect minors, to prevent discrimination, and to pro-
mote more tolerant treatment of gender variant youth.
In several other significant regards we are in full agreement with
Chief Justice Nicholson. We think it is unreasonable to require sur-
gery for a legal change in sexual status. As the court reasoned, we too
believe the requirement for surgery is inconsistent with human rights:
"The requirement is more disadvantageous and burdensome for peo-
ple seeking legal recognition of their transition from female to male
than male to female... the requirement of surgery is a form of indirect
discrimination."'' 93 And we are in agreement regarding the require-
ments for changing of one's birth certificate. It can be detrimental to
self-image and overall social and geographic mobility for a minor to
provide a birth certificate antithetical to his or her self-image or bodily
presentation. We think there is no need for waiting either for the age
of majority or for requiring surgery.
The legal status of minors and adults poses challenging problems
for courts worldwide. With public awareness of an increasing num-
192 Wallbank, supra note 188, at 35-36.
193 Re Alex (2004) 180 Fam. L. R.. 89, 131, available at
http://www.familycourt.gov.au/judge/2004/html/realex.html. The reliance on sur-
gery, and via its use to remove a penis and consider that a sign of maleness, disre-
gards conditions such as the complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (CAIS), 5-
alpha-reductase deficiency, and 17beta-hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase deficiency
where males are born without a penis. It similarly can wrongly categorize conditions
like congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) where females are born with phalluses. It
denies the reality that one's brain sex is more crucial in determining sexual and gen-
der identity than are genitals. See Milton Diamond & Linda Watson, Androgen In-
sensitivity Syndrome and Klinefelter's Syndrome Sex and Gender Considerations, 13
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 623 (2004) (discussing the psy-
chological and social features of AIS); Vivian Sobel & Julianne Imperato-McGinely,
Gender Identity in XY Intersexuality, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS
N. AM. 609 (2004) (exploring the issues of gender identity associated in types of XY
intersexuality); Melissa Hines, Psychosexual Development in Individuals Who Have
Female Pseudohermaphroditism, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N.
AM. 641 (2004) (discussing psychological alterations in cases of female pseudoher-
maphrodism); William G. Reiner, Psychosexual Development in Genetic Males As-
signed Female: The Cloacal Exstrophy Experience, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRIC CLIICS N. AM. 657 (2004) (discussing the impact of interventions on
children with anomalous genitalia).
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ber of persons undergoing transsexual change this need will similarly
increase. In 2002, the European Court of Human Rights, considering a
case brought before it from the United Kingdom upheld the rights of
post-operative transsexuals "to be recognized as members of their
post-operative sex and to receive all rights associated with their ac-
quired sex." 194 We think, along with similar decisions in other coun-
tries, 195 the United States too should recognize the human rights in-
volved and accord full rights to those citizens with a transsexual con-
dition. Moreover, because the transition, either in adulthood, but es-
pecially in childhood and adolescence, can be protracted and surgery
is increasingly not necessarily the endpoint, it is far better, rather than
accepting outdated concepts, to welcome the latest scientific under-
standings of identity development and to recognize a wide range of
gender variation as a reality of the human condition.1
96
194 Leslie I. Lax, Is the United States Falling Behind? Recognition of Post-
Operative Transsexuals 'Acquired Sex in the United States and Abroad, 7 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 123 (2003) (discussing Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
18 (2002-VI) (recognizing legal rights of male to female transsexual)). On 1 July
2004 Britain enacted the Gender Recognition Act. The law essentially accords indi-
viduals diagnosed with GID the right to a new birth certificate and all rights of their
desired gender. Significantly the law does not stipulate that a transsexual must have
undergone a sex-change operation; they must only provide evidence that they plan to
live permanently in their new gender. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (Eng.),
available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/400 0 7--a.htm#l (last
visited Feb. 24, 2005).
195 See Lax, supra note 195, at 130-50 (examining cases outside the United
States).
196 See Weiss, supra note 191 at 177-80 (arguing that post-surgery status
should be irrelevant).
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